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This dissertation consists of three studies in behavioral and experimental economics.
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cannot be enforced and investigate how different kinds of behavioral biases lead to the use
of different types of payments (pre-voting transfers vs. promises of post-voting transfer).
I provide a simple model of the vote buying exchange as a one-shot interaction of a buyer
and a voter, where voting is costly and done in private, and the buyer may make offers with
different payments types. I investigate the effects of three behavioral biases on buyer and
voter behavior: inequity aversion, guilt aversion and voter reciprocity. Using a laboratory
experiment, I present evidence that support the presence of all three behavioral biases.
The second chapter is a joint work with Erkut Y. Ozbay. We study the optimality of pre-
and post-voting payments to buy votes in an environment where both the buyer and the
voter are able to commit to their promises. Using a modified version of the model used in
Chapter 1, we investigate the implications of different risk attitudes and inequity aversion
on agent behavior. We test the predictions of different preferences using a lab experiment.
Our results support the presence of inequity aversion in this environment.
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Chapter 1: Vote Buying with Non-Binding Promises
1.1 Introduction
People in democratic societies make many decisions through voting. These decisions
range from elections to choose representatives, referenda to choose policies, shareholder
votes to decide on executive compensations, department votes on whom to hire, to the
mundane case of deciding where to go to dinner. When there is a decision to be made col-
lectively, it is natural that people will want to sway the votes to their desired outcome. One
way to achieve such an outcome is vote buying. Vote buying refers to giving particularized
benefits (money, goods or services) to voters in exchange for their votes. The practice of
vote buying is undesired in many voting environments as it is thought to undermine the
intent of the vote, which is to relay the preferences, sentiments, and private information
of the voters. Moreover, vote buying may hinder accountability in the case of electing rep-
resentatives. As a result, vote buying is strictly prohibited in many voting environments
and secret ballot has been introduced to deter vote buying. Despite the countermeasures,
however, vote buying remains prevalent, especially in developing countries. For example,
vote buying has been documented in elections in Argentina (Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes,
2004), Egypt (Blaydes, 2006), Lebanon (Corstange, 2012), Mexico (Cantú, 2016), Nicaragua
(Gonzalez-Ocantos, Kieviet de Jonge, Melendez, Osorio, and Nickerson, 2011), Paraguay
(Finan and Schechter, 2012), Taiwan (Wang and Kurzman, 2007), and Turkey (Çarkoğlu
1
and Aytaç, 2015). In Africa, accounts of electoral handouts exist for a number of countries
including Benin, Ghana (Jensen and Justesen, 2014), Nigeria (Bratton, 2008), São Tomé and
Prı́ncipe (Vicente, 2014) and Kenya (Kramon, 2016).
The undemocratic nature of vote buying and its prevalence in spite of countermeasures
have positioned vote buying as a major issue in political science and political economy lit-
eratures. At first glance, the occurrence of vote buying is puzzling because the introduction
of secret ballot creates a severe double commitment problem: a voter who has accepted a
pre-voting transfer from a buyer may not keep her promise to deliver the vote, and a buyer
who has made a promise to deliver some benefit after winning may not keep his promise as
well.1 Therefore, many studies focus on how these commitment problems are solved. For
example, Stokes (2005) uses Argentinean election data and argues that parties make use
of local brokers to imperfectly monitor voters and take advantage of repeated interaction
to credibly commit to punishing voters that do not comply.2 While other methods such as
Tasmanian Dodge, two-part payment schemes, rigged bets,3 gift cards conditionally acti-
vated (Cantú, 2016), and collective vote monitoring by small group of voters (Rueda, 2016)
have also been suggested as ways to overcome the voter commitment problem in the litera-
ture, there are many cases in which these solutions are not feasible. For example, Guardado
and Wantchékon (2016) and Kramon (2016) argue that parties in Africa do not have means
to use the solutions listed above. In these cases the occurrence of vote buying remains a
puzzle.
In this chapter I shed light on this puzzle and show how vote buying may occur in a
1I adopt a broader definition of vote buying which includes post-voting delivery of benefits, conditional
on winning. This practice is referred to as clientelistic vote buying in the political science literature (Nichter,
2014).
2There are also studies that question whether these commitment problems exist in the first place. For ex-
ample Nichter (2008) uses the same Argentinean election data as Stokes (2005) and argues that vote buying is
actually turnout buying, and hence the problem is not moral hazard but adverse selection.
3See Schaffer (2007) for various examples.
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non-repeating interaction where monitoring of vote and enforcement of promises are not
possible. Since economic models with selfish agents would completely rule out the oc-
currence of vote buying in such an environment, I investigate (i) how different kinds of
behavioral biases might enable vote buying, and (ii) how these biases lead to the use of
different types of payments (pre- vs. post-voting transfers). In order to answer these ques-
tions, I modify the vote buying model of Dekel, Jackson, and Wolinsky (2008) into a one
buyer (”candidate”, henceforth) and one voter interaction, allowing the candidate to make
simultaneous offers of pre- and post-voting payments (henceforth ”up-front payment” and
”conditional payment”, respectively). In this environment promises are non-binding and
information is complete but imperfect. The imperfect information is due to secret ballot.
Using this model of vote buying, I investigate the effects of three different behavioral biases
on candidate and voter behavior: inequity aversion (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr and
Schmidt, 1999), guilt aversion (Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007; Charness and Dufwen-
berg, 2006) and reciprocity (Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004). These biases have been
studied extensively in the behavioral economics literature. There is ample evidence that
economic behavior is affected by concerns for fairness and equity, especially in bargaining
situations and environments without market competition. Social preferences (such as guilt
aversion and reciprocity) have also been suggested as an explanation for the occurrence of
cooperation and coordination in environments that lack commitment devices.4
In this study, I develop separate testable predictions of behavior under each of the afore-
mentioned behavioral biases. First, I assume that the players are inequity averse, i.e. they
bear a utility cost whenever there is a deviation from equitable payoff distribution. I use
Fehr and Schmidt (1999)’s specification for inequity aversion as it allows higher sensitivity
4See Camerer (2003) and Cooper and Kagel (2013) for an overview of the experimental results.
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to cases where the inequity is to the disadvantage of a player (own payoff is lower than the
other player’s payoff) than to cases where the inequity is to the advantage of a player (own
payoff is higher than the other player’s payoff). I show that the type of payment through
which vote buying can occur depends on the candidate’s sensitivity towards advantageous
inequity. If the candidate’s sensitivity to advantageous inequity is low, his5 commitment
problem precludes him from buying vote with up-front payments. Furthermore, voter’s
willingness to engage in vote buying is affected by the potential gain of the candidate; as
candidate’s potential gain rises, voter’s minimum accepted payment rises while her likeli-
hood of voting declines.
Next, I assume that the players are guilt averse. In this case players bear a utility cost
when they fail to honor a promise that they made and that promise improves the payoff of
the other player. I show that, conditional on the candidate being guilt averse, the type of
payment through which vote buying can occur depends on the voter’s cost of not keeping
her promises. If this cost is sufficiently high, then vote buying can occur with both up-
front and conditional payments. However, if the cost is low, vote buying may only occur
through conditional payments. Moreover, neither voter’s minimum accepted payment nor
her likelihood of voting are affected by the potential gains of the candidate. Guilt aversion
also predicts that candidate transfers a positive fraction of the amount he promised, despite
the fact that his promises are not binding.
Finally, I assume that the voter is reciprocal. This implies that, conditional on observing
the candidate taking an action that she considers as kind, the voter gains additional utility
from taking an action that improves the payoff of the candidate, even if this action is costly.
Under this assumption, I show that vote buying may only occur though up-front payments
5In this chapter, whenever required, I refer to the candidate as ”he”, and the voter as ”she” for simplicity.
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with payment sizes that are considered as kind by the voter. This requires the payment to
be higher than the cost of voting. However, conditional on the payment being higher than
the cost of voting, as the potential gain of the candidate rises, voter’s minimum accepted
transfer declines, while the likelihood of voting a voter who has accepted up-front payment
rises.
I test the theoretical predictions of behavioral biases in a lab experiment designed to
shed light on which of these biases might be most important in affecting candidate and voter
behavior. By varying the gains of the candidate upon winning and the voter’s influence on
the voting outcome, the experiment allows me to uncover the salient features of the voting
environment that make vote buying more likely. Another advantage of using experimental
data is the accurate information on the receipt of payments, the delivery of vote as well as
the underlying preference of the voter.
My results support the presence of all three behavioral biases: inequity aversion, guilt
aversion and voter reciprocity. First, I find that vote buying occurs in a statistically sig-
nificant fraction of the observations. This allows me to rule out selfish preferences as the
sole explanation of behavior. Second, vote buying occurs primarily through conditional
payments, which implies that voter reciprocity cannot be the sole behavioral bias behind
vote buying; both inequity aversion and guilt aversion may have played a role in enabling
vote buying. Third, candidates’ offers and payments rejected by voters are positively corre-
lated with the size of the candidate’s potential gain, which further supports the presence of
inequity aversion in voter preferences. Fourth, for voters who have accepted up-front pay-
ment, the likelihood of voting rises in the size of the up-front payment and the candidate’s
potential gain, which provide support to voter reciprocity. Fifth, voters who have accepted
conditional payment are more likely to vote as the size of the up-front payment offers they
5
have been presented rises, which is consistent with Guardado and Wantchékon (2016) and
Kramon (2016)’s argument that up-front payment acts as a costly signal, possibly of can-
didate’s trustworthiness/credibility. Sixth, about 50% of the candidates keep their condi-
tional payment promises fully, and 40% of the candidates keep their promises partially,
even though there is no enforcement of their promises. This result suggests the presence
of guilt aversion in candidate preferences and supports Corazzini, Kube, Maréchal, and
Nicolo (2014)’s results that promises are more than cheap talk. Finally, transfer-to-offer ra-
tio is positively correlated with the candidate’s potential gain, which points to the need
of adding another dimension to the current guilt aversion models; cost of not keeping a
promise may be amplified when benefits accrued via that promise increase.
Related Literature and Contribution
This study builds upon and contributes to four strands of literature. The first is on
the relationship between behavioral biases and voting behavior. Notably, existing litera-
ture in this area focus on almost exclusively on the norm of reciprocity. In a widely cited
paper, Finan and Schechter (2012) use data from voter and local broker surveys and field
experiments conducted in Paraguay to argue that vote buying is sustained by local brokers’
knowledge about voters’ attitudes towards reciprocity. Such knowledge enables political
parties to target reciprocal voters with small cash transfers or gifts to swing their votes.
Lawson and Greene (2014) use survey data from Mexico and argue the same point. In
addition, results of Manacorda, Miguel, and Vigorito (2011) De La O (2013) and Zucco
(2013) show that incumbents can use welfare programs (such as conditional cash transfers)
to successfully increase turnout and favorable votes in the short run, implying that reci-
procity is a salient feature of voter behavior. Chang (2016a,b) provides support for the role
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of reciprocity motive in enabling vote buying both theoretically and experimentally. In a
two-candidate one-voter environment, where the voter initially prefers one candidate over
the other, Chang allows one of the candidates to make an up-front transfer to the voter. He
finds that the transfer increases the likelihood that the voter votes for the candidate making
the transfer, regardless of whether he is the voter’s initially preferred candidate. Further-
more if a candidate has the ability to make a transfer but chooses not to, then the likelihood
of the voter voting for that candidate falls, regardless of voter’s initial preference over can-
didates. Hence, Chang’s results suggest that both positive and negative reciprocity play a
role in enabling vote buying under ballot secrecy. I complement this literature by show-
ing that the behavioral biases of inequity and guilt aversion may also play a role in vote
decisions.
The second strand of literature relates the occurrence of vote buying to the effectiveness
of pre- vs. post-voting transfers. Stokes (2005) argues that long term clientelistic relation-
ships (and hence post-voting transfers) with imperfect monitoring of votes incentivize the
voters to vote and thereby sustain vote buying in Argentina. Complementing this argu-
ment, Hanusch, Keefer, and Vlaicu (2016) argue that vote buying with pre-voting transfers
arise when candidates have low credibility. Similarly, Kramon (2016) and Guardado and
Wantchékon (2016) contend that pre-voting transfers do not, by themselves, affect voting
behavior; instead it is the future benefits that the pre-voting transfers signal motivate voters
to vote. My experimental results provide support for this argument by showing that the
likelihood of voting increases among voters who choose to accept conditional payment.
Third, this study is related to the literature on moral hazard with social preferences and
the effectiveness of pre- vs. post-realization transfers over inducing costly effort. Previ-
ous literature has arguments for both types of transfers. For example, inequity aversion
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supports the use of post-realization transfers; Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt (2007) argue that
if employees are inequity averse, contracts that offer voluntary and unenforceable bonus
for satisfactory performance are superior to explicit incentive contracts, which in turn are
superior to trust contracts that pay a generous wage up-front. Similarly, Dur and Glazer
(2008) argue that when workers envy their boss, the worker should get a share from the
profit in the optimal contract, regardless of the worker’s risk preference. In contrast, reci-
procity may support the use of pre-realization transfers. Englmaier and Leider (2012) show
generous compensation can substitute for performance-based pay, especially when output
is a poor signal of effort. Gneezy and Rey-Biel (2014) provide evidence for the superior
effectiveness of noncontingent payments over performance-based pay from a field exper-
iment. I contribute to this strand of literature by studying the interaction between social
preferences and payment types in a vote buying context, which is an environment where
both the principal and the agent have commitment problems.
Finally, this study contributes to the literature on the behavioral bias of guilt aversion.
Existing studies on guilt aversion focus on the role of players’ beliefs about other player’s
payoff expectations. For example, Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), Charness and Dufwen-
berg (2010) and Battigalli, Charness, and Dufwenberg (2013) consider the effect of commu-
nication in the formation of payoff expectations and players’ beliefs about these expecta-
tions, and Ellingsen, Johannesson, Tjøtta, and Torsvik (2010) focus on the effect of relaying
the payoff expectations of other players to decision makers. Additionally, Kawagoe and
Narita (2014) compare the guilt resulting from not living up to payoff expectations of other
players to not living up to payoff expectations of other players that are raised by their very own
actions. I contribute to this strand of literature by providing evidence that there exists a re-
lationship between the extent of promise keeping and one’s gain. My experimental results
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show that among candidates who do not keep their promises fully, the candidates whose
gains were higher transferred a higher fraction of their promises. This suggests that cost of
not keeping a promise may be amplified when benefits accrued via that promise increase.
I proceed as follows. In Section 2, I present my model of the vote buying exchange. In
Section 3, I present three different behavioral biases that may account for the occurrence
of vote buying. In section 4, I list the testable predictions under each behavioral bias for
each stage of the game. In Section 5, I present the experimental design, and Section 6 the
experimental results. Finally in Section 7 I offer some concluding remarks.
1.2 A Simple Vote Buying Game
I consider a one-shot interaction of one candidate with one voter. Suppose, as a result
of a voting process, the candidate may receive rentW > 0 and the voter may affect the can-
didate’s chances of receiving this rent. More specifically, suppose that if the voter votes for
the candidate, then the probability of the candidate winningW changes from p to p′ where
p ∈ [0, 1] and p′ ∈ [p, 1].6 The difference in the winning probability can be interpreted in
two different ways. First interpretation is about the size of the voting body. For very large
voting bodies, an individual voter’s contribution to the winning probability is effectively
zero. In the model this corresponds to the case p′ = p. For smaller voting bodies, the con-
tribution of a single vote to the winning probability would be larger than zero. Moreover,
for cases where a single vote is pivotal, p′ exactly equals 1. Second, this specification also
applies to cases where a leader mobilizes a group of voters. This interpretation is consistent
with the recent study by Holland and Palmer-Rubin (2015) that focuses on organizational
6In modeling the result of the vote as a probabilistic process, I assume that other voters’ behavior (which I do
not model) is uncertain but both the candidate and the voter have common beliefs about them. The existence
of these beliefs can be attributed either to the uncertainty about other voters’ preferences or their choice over
voting vs. abstaining. This interpretation borrows its intuition from probabilistic voting models. See Mueller
(2003) for an overview.
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brokers who ”negotiate a price that they will be paid to persuade their members to support
the party...” and ”usually, but not always, pass along a portion of this payment as individual
or collective goods to mobilize their members for the election.”
It is costly for the voter to vote. This cost, denoted by d, may simply represent the phys-
ical costs associated to voting,7 or it may be viewed as the monetary value of the disutility
of voting for a candidate the voter does not initially favor. In this sense, this model does
not differentiate between turnout and vote buying; both the cost of turning out and policy
preferences are contained in the catchall variable, d.
The candidate may offer to compensate voter’s cost of voting, and the compensation
may take two different forms: up-front payment (UFP) and conditional payment (CP). With
up-front payment, the candidate makes an immediate transfer to the voter upon voter’s
acceptance of the offer. Thus, up-front payment takes place before the vote with the implicit
understanding that the voter will vote. With conditional payment, the candidate promises
to make a transfer to the voter only if the candidate winsW . However, this promise is non-
binding for the candidate. I denote candidate’s offers as the pair (mUFP,mCP) ∈ R2+. Up-
front payment is financed out of candidate’s initial budget,Bc, while conditional payment is
financed out of the larger budget, (Bc+W ), with the addition of the rent. These conditions
restrict the candidate to making offers that he can fulfill.
For simplicity, I assume that the voter can accept at most one type of payment in ex-
change for her vote. I also assume that players’ respective budgets (W,Bc, Bv), the proba-
bilities of winning with and without the voter’s vote (p and p′), and the voter’s cost of voting
(d) are common knowledge.
The game described above is a sequential move game with imperfect information with




• Offer making: The candidate presents offers (mUFP,mCP) to the voter.
• Offer selection: Observing the candidate’s offers, voter chooses whether to accept
compensation from the candidate, and if so, which type of payment she accepts.
If the voter accepts up-front payment, mUFP is transferred to the voter.
2. Voting stage: In private, voter decides whether to vote for the candidate.
3. (Post-voting transfer stage): If the voter has chosen conditional payment at the offer
selection stage and the candidate wins W , the candidate decides on the amount of
transfer, t ∈ [0, Bc +W ], he makes to the voter.
1.3 Theories of Agent Behavior
In this section I present the main properties of the game equilibria under various be-
havioral bias assumptions. I start with selfish preferences as the baseline.
Proposition 1.1. (Selfish preferences) Suppose both players care only about their own monetary
payoffs. Then, vote buying cannot occur due to the double sided commitment problems. In any
equilibrium the candidate offers zero up-front payment and does not transfer anything to the voter
at the post-election stage, and the voter never votes at the voting stage, regardless of her choice at the
offer choice stage.
Proof. At the post-election stage, regardless of the offer he has made previously and the
probabilities p and p′, the candidate optimally chooses to transfer nothing to the voter. An-
ticipating this, the voter does not vote at the voting stage. At the offer stage, voter’s optimal
11
strategy is to accept any non-zero up-front payment offer – otherwise the voter is indiffer-
ent between accepting a conditional payment offer and not accepting any payment. As a
result the candidate never makes a positive up-front payment offer in equilibrium, but may
make non-zero conditional payment offers. 
Inequity aversion
In their widely cited article Fehr and Schmidt (1999) propose preferences that take in-
equity concerns into consideration. In a two player game, given material payoffs (πi, πj) of
players i and j, the utility of player i is given by
ui(πi, πj) = πi − αi max {πj − πi, 0} − βi max {πi − πj , 0} , i, j ∈ {C, V } , i 6= j (1.1)
where the parameters αi and βi measure player i’s sensitivity to disadvantageous and
advantageous inequity, respectively. Following Fehr and Schmidt, I assume βi ≤ αi and
0 ≤ βi < 1 where i, j ∈ {C, V }. These parameter assumptions imply that players bear
higher utility costs for inequity in cases where the inequity is to their disadvantage (own
payoff is lower than the other player’s payoff) than to cases where the inequity is to their
advantage (own payoff is higher than the other player’s payoff).
In the vote buying game, since there is uncertainty over the outcome of the voting
process, I assume that players care about the inequity in payoffs in different states of the
world (ex-post inequity averse), instead of the inequity in expected payoffs (ex-ante inequity
averse). However, they maximize expected utility and are risk neutral. This implies that
players weight the inequity in payoffs in different states of the world proportionally to the
relative probabilities of the states.
The equilibria under the assumption of inequity aversion can be divided into two, de-
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pending on candidate’s sensitivity to advantageous inequity. If the candidate is not partic-
ularly averse to inequity in this dimension (i.e. the value of the parameter βC is less than
0.5) then, in equilibrium, vote buying is only possible via up-front payment. However, if
βC ≥ 0.5, vote buying occurs only via conditional payment in equilibrium. The threshold
value of βC = 0.5 is due to candidate’s comparison of the following two cases: keeping one
extra dollar to himself or giving the extra dollar to the voter. While keeping the dollar in-
creases candidate’s utility by one unit, giving the dollar to the voter results in a utility loss
of 2βC units. Below I briefly describe equilibrium behavior under inequity aversion. In the
appendix, I provide detailed proof of the results. Since it is a one-shot game, all proofs are
done with backward induction.
First, suppose that the candidate is either completely selfish (αC = βC = 0) or is inequity
averse with low sensitivity to advantageous inequity (0 < βC < 0.5). Then, in equilibrium,
the candidate and the voter follow the equilibrium strategies below.
Post-voting transfer: The candidate who is not sufficiently averse to advantageous inequity,
regardless of his offers, does not transfer a positive amount to the voter, i.e. t∗ = 0.
Voting stage: The voter does not vote if she has accepted up-front payment that is less
than one-half of the cost of voting, accepted conditional payment, or did not accept
payment. The minimum up-front payment offer that also incentivizes the voter to
vote, x, increases as rent (W ) increases. Moreover, voter’s utility decreases in (p′ −
p)W .
Offer selection stage: The voter accepts positive up-front payment offers. If she receives
an offer in which only conditional payment is positive, she does not accept since she
expects the candidate to transfer zero in the transfer stage.
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Offer making stage: The candidate never makes an up-front payment offer less than the
cost of voting, while conditional payment offers may take any value. Candidate’s
utility increases in (p′ − p)W , hence equilibrium up-front payment offer increases in
(p′ − p)W .
Proposition 1.2. (Candidate insensitive to advantageous inequity). If the candidate’s sen-
sitivity to advantageous inequity is sufficiently low (β < 0.5), then vote buying only occurs with
up-front payment.
Proof. In the appendix. 
Suppose now that the candidate is inequity averse with high sensitivity to advantageous
inequity (0.5 ≤ βC < 1). Then, the candidate and the voter follow the equilibrium strategies
below.
Post-voting transfer: The candidate who is sufficiently averse to advantageous inequity




. (If βC > 0.5, the
candidate transfers t∗ = W+d2 .)
Voting stage: If the accepted up-front payment is less than one-half of the cost of voting, the
voter does not vote. The minimum accepted payments that also incentivize the voter
to vote, x and t, increases as rent (W ) increases. Moreover, voter’s utility decreases in
(p′ − p)W .
Offer making stage: Although vote buying with up-front payments is feasible, candidate
strictly prefers vote buying with conditional payment if p′ < 1. If p′ = 1, this prefer-
ence is weak. Thus, when vote buying is individually rational and p′ < 1, he makes a
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positive conditional payment offer while he never makes a positive up-front payment
offer.
Proposition 1.3. (Candidate sensitive to advantageous inequity). If the candidate’s sensi-
tivity to advantageous inequity is sufficiently high (βC ≥ 0.5), then vote buying only occurs with
conditional payment.
Proof. In the appendix. 
Guilt aversion
Guilt is driven from a player’s failure to live up to expectations (Baumeister, Stillwell,
and Heatherton, 1994). Beliefs have originally been incorporated into utility through psy-
chological games by Geanakoplos, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1989). Battigalli and Dufwenberg
(2007) formalize and extend this idea to introduce two concepts of guilt aversion. With sim-
ple guilt, a player cares about whether and how much he lets another player down, while
guilt from blame assumes that a player cares about ”others’ inferences regarding how much
he is willing to let them down.” Thus, with simple guilt, players bear a utility cost when
they fail to honor a promise that they made and honoring that promise improves the payoff
of the other player.
In the context of the vote buying game, I consider the concept of simple guilt and derive
its consequences on the behavior of the candidate whose positive conditional payment offer
is accepted, and the voter who has accepted some form of payment.
The form of the utility function incorporating simple guilt aversion is
ui = πi − ΦiCi(.) i ∈ {C, V } (1.2)
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where πi denotes player i’s material payoff, Φi ≥ 0 denotes his sensitivity to not keeping
his promise and Ci(.) denotes the cost of not keeping his promise. Following Corazzini,
Kube, Maréchal, and Nicolo (2014), I assume the candidate’s cost of not keeping his promise
increases with the promise, mCP, and is convex in the difference between his promise and
the actual transfer, (mCP − t). For the voter, the cost of not keeping her promise increases
with candidate’s probability of winning if the voter votes, p′, and is convex in the voter’s
contribution to winning probability, (p′− p). Moreover, the voter does not bear a cost if her
contribution to the winning probability is zero, i.e. (p′− p) = 0. Below is a summary of the
equilibrium behavior in each stage of the game. Detailed proof of the results is provided
in the appendix.
Post-voting transfer: The candidate transfers a fraction of his conditional payment offer,
i.e. t∗ ≤ mCP.
Voting stage: If the cost of voting is less than the cost of not keeping her promise (d <
ΦV Cv(p
′, p)), the voter votes when she accepts some form of payment. However, in the
opposite case (d ≥ ΦV Cv(p′, p)), the voter votes only if she has accepted conditional
payment and the transfer of the candidate is sufficient to cover the difference between
the cost of not keeping her promise and the cost of voting.
Offer stage: If the cost of voting is less than the cost of not keeping her promise (d <
ΦV Cv(p
′, p)) and vote buying is individually rational for the candidate, the candi-







. If the cost of voting is greater
than the cost of not keeping her promise, the candidate chooses mUFP = 0, while the
optimal conditional payment offer depends on the difference of cost of voting and not
keeping her promise.
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Proposition 1.4. (Guilt aversion). Suppose both the candidate and the voter are guilt averse. If
the voter’s cost of not keeping her promise is greater than the cost of voting, then vote buying occurs
with either up-front or conditional payment; if voter’s cost of not keeping her promise is less than the
cost of voting, then vote buying occurs only with conditional payment.
Proof. In the appendix. 
Figure 1.1 demonstrates the equilibrium outcome in terms of vote buying over the (p, p′)
space, with parametersW = 200, ΦC = 4 and ΦV = 50. At the region where voter’s guilt is
larger than the cost of voting, the candidate buys the vote with either up-front payment or
conditional payment. Whenever voter’s guilt is smaller than the cost of voting, vote buying
occurs with conditional payment.
Figure 1.1
Vote-buying Outcomes with Guilt Aversion, W = 200, ΦC = 4, ΦV = 50
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Voter Reciprocity
Formally incorporated into game theory by Rabin (1993), reciprocity is based on the idea
that people would like to be kind to people who are kind to them, while they are willing
to take costly actions that harm the people who have been unkind to them. Extending
this idea into sequential games, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) allow a player’s belief
about other players’ kindness to depend on the history of the game. In the context of the
vote buying game, I consider how voter reciprocity may bring forth vote buying with up-
front payments.8 I assume that the candidate is selfish but the voter is reciprocal. Utility
incorporating the voter’s reciprocity motives has the form
UV (πv, πc) = πv + θkcπc (1.3)
where πv, πc denote the material payoffs of the voter and candidate, respectively, while
θ > 0 denotes voter’s sensitivity towards candidate’s payoff, and kc is candidate’s kindness
towards the voter. I assume the voter perceives up-front payment offers greater than the
cost of voting as ”kind”.9 Following Cabral, Ozbay, and Schotter (2014), I also assume that
candidate’s kindness increases in the magnitude of his sacrifice, i.e. the size of the up-front
payment offer. Thus candidate’s kindness towards the voter is given by
kc(x) = Ix>dx (1.4)
8Except for the special case where (p, p′) = (0, 1), it is impossible for the the candidate to observe the vote
decision. Moreover, since voting decision takes place after the choice of payment type, the candidate is less
likely to perceive actions of the voter as kind.
9Since offering positive up-front payment is risky for the candidate, at first glance, it may be considered
as kind. However, if the up-front payment does not cover the cost of voting, positive reciprocation results in
the voter to have lower material payoff than if she does not accept the payment at all. In this case we have a
paradoxical situation where the voter is grateful towards the candidate who is making her worse off in material
payoffs.
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where x denotes the up-front payment offer, Ix>d is an indicator variable that takes a value
of 1 if the up-front payment is greater than the cost of voting and 0 otherwise. Below is a
summary of the equilibrium behavior in each stage of the game.
Post-voting transfer: The candidate does not transfer a positive amount to the voter i.e.
t∗ = 0.
Voting stage: The voter does not vote if she accepts up-front payment that is less than the
cost of voting, conditional payment or if she does not accept payment. The minimum
up-front payment that incentivizes the voter to vote is greater than the cost of voting
and decreases in candidate’s expected gain, (p′ − p)W .
Offer stage: The candidate makes the up-front payment offer mUFP = dθ(p′−p)W whenever
this amount is greater than the cost of voting and vote buying is individually rational.
Proposition 1.5. (Voter reciprocity). If the candidate is selfish and the voter is reciprocal, vote
buying occurs only with up-front payment.
Proof. In the appendix. 
Figure 1.2 demonstrates the equilibrium outcome in terms of vote buying over the (p, p′)
space, with parameters W = 50, BC = 20 and θ = 0.025. Vote buying occurs only at the
north-west corner of the (p, p′) space. In the region marked with blue, either vote buying
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The experiment was run at the Experimental Economics Laboratory at the University
of Maryland (EEL-UMD). 158 undergraduate students at the University of Maryland par-
ticipated. Five sessions were conducted in Summer 2015 for each of the treatments, high
and low rent (W = 50 and W = 200). No subject participated in more than one session.
Participants were seated in isolated booths. The experiment was programmed in z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 2007).
At the beginning of each session, one half of the participants were assigned randomly
to the role of ”candidate” and the other half was assigned to the role of ”voter”. These
roles stayed fixed throughout the session. In a session, candidates were paired randomly
and anonymously with voters in each of the 20 periods. Candidate’s rent (W ) was kept
constant throughout a session.
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In each period, the candidate and the voter had the same initial token endowment
(BC = BV = 20), the cost of voting was the same (d = 10), and each pair was assigned
two numbers: the candidate’s initial probability of winning (p), and the candidate’s proba-
bility of winning if the voter votes (p′). These numbers were drawn randomly from uniform
distributions.10,11 After both the candidate and the voter were informed about the winning
probabilities, the candidate was asked to decide on his offers for the two possible forms
of payment, up-front and conditional payment, to the voter in exchange for her vote. The
voter was then informed about the candidate’s offers, and was asked to decide whether
she wanted to accept an offer from the candidate and if so, which type of payment she ac-
cepted. The voter’s decision at this step was relayed to the candidate. Next, the voter was
asked whether she wanted to vote for the candidate. Voting decision was not relayed to the
candidate. If the voter decided to vote, the election took place with the candidate’s proba-
bility of winning being p′, otherwise it took place with winning probability p. If the voter
had accepted conditional payment from the candidate at the offer stage and the candidate
had won, the candidate was reminded of his conditional payment offer and was asked to
choose an amount to transfer to the voter.
Earnings in each period depended on whether vote buying took place, and if so, which
type of payment was accepted by the voter and the result of the election lottery. After all
periods were finished, one round of the 20 was chosen randomly and the participants were
paid their earnings on that round. The participants were also paid a participation fee of $5.
Participants earned $13 on average. Screen shots from the experiment program and a copy
of the instructions are provided in the Appendix.
10p was drawn from U [0, 1], while p′ was drawn from U [p, 1].
11For each treatment, in three out of five sessions, the same set of (p,p’) pairs were presented to the subjects.
I refer to data from these sessions as ”matched.” For the remaining two sessions of each treatment, the (p,p’)
pairs are not matched one-to-one between treatments. I use the latter data only for regression analysis.
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1.5 Hypotheses
The testable predictions of each behavioral bias based on the occurrence of vote buying
and the stages of the game is given below.
1.5.1 Vote buying
Define vote buying as the voter accepting some type of payment and then voting for
the candidate. Thus, if the voter accepts payment but does not vote, vote buying does not
occur. The predictions of different theories are:
Selfish preferences: Vote buying never occurs.
Inequity Aversion: Vote buying occurs via either up-front or conditional payment for some
probability pairs (p, p′).
Guilt Aversion: Vote buying occurs via either up-front or conditional payment for some
probability pairs (p, p′).
Voter Reciprocity: Vote buying occurs only via up-front payment for some probability
pairs (p, p′).
1.5.2 Offer stage
Selfish preferences: Candidate never offers positive up-front payment, but may make pos-
itive conditional payment offer.
Inequity Aversion: Candidate makes positive offers in either payment types for some prob-
ability pairs (p, p′). The likelihood of candidate making positive offers increases in
candidate’s marginal expected rent, (p′ − p)W . The size of offers increase as the can-
didate’s rent, W, increases.
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Guilt Aversion: Candidate makes positive offers for some probability pairs (p, p′); the like-
lihood of candidate making positive offers increases in candidate’s marginal expected
rent, (p′ − p)W . Up-front payment offer is equal to the cost of voting, while condi-
tional payment is, in expectation, greater than or equal to the cost of voting. Size of
payments in rejected offers by the voter do not respond to changes in the candidate’s
rent.
Voter Reciprocity: Candidate makes positive offers for some probability pairs (p, p′); the
likelihood of candidate making positive offers increases in candidate’s marginal ex-
pected rent, (p′ − p)W . Whenever positive, the candidate offers up-front payment
greater than the cost of voting.
1.5.3 Voting stage
Selfish preferences: Voter never votes.
Inequity Aversion: Conditional on accepting payment, voter’s likelihood of voting increases
in the payment she has accepted, and decreases in candidate’s marginal expected
earning, (p′ − p)W .
Guilt Aversion: If the voter has accepted up-front payment, voter’s likelihood of voting
increases in her contribution to winning probability, (p′− p). If she has accepted con-
ditional payment, voter’s likelihood of voting increases in the conditional payment
offer and her contribution to winning probability, (p′ − p).
Voter Reciprocity: If she has accepted up-front payment, voter’s likelihood of voting in-
creases in up-front payment and candidate’s marginal earning, (p′ − p)W .
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1.5.4 Transfer stage
Selfish preferences: Candidate does not transfer anything to the voter, i.e. t∗ = 0.





Guilt Aversion: Candidate transfers a positive amount, t∗ ∈ [0,mCP]. The average transfer-
to-offer ratio does not respond to changes in candidate’s rent.
Voter Reciprocity: Candidate does not transfer anything to the voter, i.e. t∗ = 0.
1.6 Results
In this section I analyze the data with respect to five main questions. The first two
questions are whether vote buying occurs and the conditions under which vote buying
occurs. Answers to these questions provide a description of the data as well as shed light
on whether behavioral biases are present. Next, I analyze the candidate behavior at the offer
making stage. Specifically, I consider the candidates’ utilization of up-front and conditional
offers and investigate the factors behind their decision on how much to offer. Fourth, I
analyze voter behavior. I start with analyzing voters’ choice on offers. Then, taking the
offers made by the candidates as given, I compare voters’ choices with predicted behavior
by various behavioral biases. Next, I investigate the factors behind voters decision over
voting. Finally, I examine candidates’ behavior at the transfer stage.
1.6.1 Does vote buying occur?
Vote buying occurs when some form of payment (up-front or conditional) is accepted
by the voter and the voter votes. With selfish preferences, vote buying is not predicted
to occur. In contrast to the prediction of selfish preferences, however, vote buying occurs
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in 33% of the observations. This number is significantly different from 0%.12 This result
allows me to reject selfish preferences as the sole explanation of behavior.
Does the occurrence of vote buying change with respect to the candidate’s rent? Pro-
portions test indicates that the there is a statistically significant relationship between the
occurrence of vote buying and the size of the rent. Table 1.1 presents the fraction of obser-
vations where vote buying occurs for each rent size. In the low rent treatment, vote buying
occurs in 29% of the observations. In the high rent treatment this number is 36%.
Table 1.1
Fraction of observations where vote buying occurs w.r.t. rent
Low High Proportions
(W=50) (W=200) Test
Vote Buying .29 .36 z = -2.27 (two sided)
Occurs (0.02) (0.02) p = 0.023
Number of Cases 140 173
Total Observations 480 480
Data from matched sessions. Standard errors in parentheses.
1.6.2 How does vote buying occur?
Next question is which payments are used to buy votes; up-front or conditional pay-
ment? Does the payment used depend on the winning probabilities and the rent?
I find that vote buying occurs predominantly through conditional payments, which pro-
vides support for the presence of inequity and guilt aversion, and rules out voter reciprocity
as the sole bias enabling vote buying. Of the observations where vote buying occurs, 86%
are bought with conditional payments. This number is significantly different from 50%.13
Figure 1.3 provides a first look at the payments used for vote buying in different treat-
12Binomial test, H0 : p(vb) = 0.05 prob(p(vb) 6= 0.05) = 0.000. The number 0.05 allows for the possibility of
errors by subjects.
13One sample test of proportion, z = 16.60, p=0.000
25
Figure 1.3
Occurrence of vote buying with up-front and conditional payments,
conditional on candidate’s rent
Data from matched sessions.
ments. For each (p, p′) pair presented to the subjects in the matched sessions, the figure
indicates whether vote buying has occurred with the specified payment type and at the
corresponding rent size. Observe in the figure that vote buying predominantly occurs via
conditional payment. Furthermore the occurrences of vote buying are not exclusively con-
centrated in the northern region of the graphs, indicating that pivotality (p′ = 1) is a not a
good predictor of vote buying. Table 1.2 reports the fraction of observations where condi-
tional payment is used for vote buying for each treatment. In the low rent treatment, vote
buying occurs with conditional payment in 79% of the observations where vote buying
happens. In the high rent treatment this number is 91%.14 Mann-Whitney test indicates
that the difference in vote buying with conditional payment with respect to treatments is
14These percentages are both significantly different from 50%. (Proportions test. Low rent: z=6.93, p=0.000.




Fraction of observations where conditional payment is accepted for vote buying
Mann-Whitney
W=50 W=200 U-test
Conditional Payment .79 .91 z = -2.87
(.03) (.02) p = 0.004
Observations where
vote buying occurs 140 173
Data from matched sessions. Standard errors in parentheses.
1.6.3 How do candidates make offers?
In this section I analyze how candidates behave at the offer making stage. Particularly,
do candidates make offers that are positive in both payment types? If so, do the offers
compensate for the cost of voting?
To answer these questions, in Figure 1.4, I classify the offers with respect to whether
the payments cover the cost of voting, and if so, which type of payment covers the cost
of voting. The distributions of offers with respect to this classification are significantly
different between the two treatments.15 Notice that the offers in the first two categories do
not cover the cost of voting in either of the payment types, up-front or conditional payment.
Hence, the share of the offers that do not cover the cost of voting is 44% for the low rent
treatment and 26% for the high rent treatment.
The offers in the last three offer categories (3-5) cover the cost of voting in either up-
front or conditional payments (or both). For these categories, the first thing to notice is
candidates’ predominant use of conditional payments to convince their voter counterparts.
15Pearson Chi-Square test, chi2(4)=89.97 p=0.000.
27
The share of offers that cover the cost of voting in only conditional payment type is 43% for
low rent treatment, while this number is 36% for high rent treatment. Given that up-front
payments are risky for candidates, it is also unsurprising that offers that cover the cost of
voting only with up-front payments is made least frequently.
Figure 1.4
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Data from matched sessions.
What motivates candidates to make offers that cover the cost of voting? For all behav-
ioral biases considered, the equilibrium behavior of candidate depends the winning proba-
bilities, (p, p′), and expected marginal gain of the candidate, (p′−p)W . I define an indicator
variable (”offer¿d”) which takes on the value 1 if the offer falls into categories (3-5) and 0
otherwise. Results from probit regressions reported in Table 1.3 indicate that in deciding
whether to make offers that cover the cost of voting, candidates take winning probabilities
into consideration, but they are not concerned with their marginal expected gain, (p′−p)W .
Moreover, the candidates in the high rent treatment are more eager to buy votes.
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Table 1.3
Determinants of candidate choice on making offers that cover the cost of voting,
I(Offer≥d)=1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
p -5.27*** -4.48*** -5.20*** -4.33***
(1.29) (0.82) (1.31) (0.82)
p’ 7.06*** 6.92*** 6.73*** 6.17***
(1.36) (0.93) (1.40) (0.89)
(p’-p)*W -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
p’W -0.00 -0.01
(0.01) (0.00)
High Rent 0.30 1.10** 0.08 0.61***
(0.69) (0.45) (0.26) (0.14)
period 0.02 0.02* 0.02 0.02
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Constant -1.28*** -1.72*** -1.19*** -1.49***
(0.36) (0.28) (0.39) (0.26)
Observations 800 1400 800 1400
Sessions Matched All Matched All
Random effects probit regression with candidate’s offer covering cost of voting
on either type of payment as dependent variable (offer>d=1). All regressions
include subject fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01.
Next, I consider the average size of offers with respect to the rent, which provides a
test on the presence of inequity aversion. Table 1.4 reports the average offers conditional
on (i) the offers being nonzero, and (ii) the offers covering the cost of voting. Notice that
regardless of whether the offers are positive or the offers are greater than the cost of voting,
average offers in each payment type is significantly higher in the high rent treatment. It is
also worth noting that the ratio of conditional payment offer to candidate’s budget, (B+W ),
after winning declines as rent increases. Hence, although inequity aversion makes offers
positively correlated to the rent, there is no universal offer-to-budget ratio that candidates
use as a rule of thumb when making conditional payment offers.
What factors into candidates’ decisions on the size of the offers? Tobit regressions in
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Table 1.4
Average offers w.r.t Rent Size
Mann -Whitney Observations
W=50 W=200 U-test (N50, N200)
(i) If offer is positive* UFP 7.24 11.33 z = -7.00 (164, 252)
(0.35) (0.37) p = 0.000
CP 21.91 42.78 z = -8.46 (394, 421)
(0.77) (1.80) p = 0.000
E(CP) 16.60 31.15 z = -8.17
(0.65) (1.30) p = 0.000
CP/(B+W) .31 .19 z = 9.48
(0.01) (0.01) p = 0.000
(ii) If offer covers UFP 12.08 13.96 z = -2.68 (63, 184)
cost of voting** (0.41) (0.33) p = 0.007
CP 29.14 54.75 z = -9.97 (244, 308)
(0.93) (2.06) p = 0.000
E(CP) 23.20 40.15 z = -8.99
(0.79) (1.47) p = 0.000
CP/(B+W) .42 .25 z = 11.21
(0.01) (0.01) p = 0.000
Data from matched sessions. Standard errors in parentheses.
*For conditional payment, expected value of the offer must be positive.
**For conditional payment, expected value of the offer must cover the cost of voting.
Table 1.5 provide a more detailed picture on candidates’ offer making behavior. In general,
candidates rely on the winning probabilities (p, p′) and on the size of the rent when making
their decisions on how much to offer. Furthermore, as candidates gain more experience in
playing the game, they use conditional payments more frequently than up-front payments.
This is indicated by the coefficient of the variable ”period” having opposite signs in regres-
sions for up-front payment and conditional payment.
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Table 1.5
Determinants of offer size
(1) (2) (3)
mUFP mCP mCP/B+W
p -7.83*** -26.64*** -0.38***
(3.01) (6.19) (0.04)
p’ 7.41** 5.45 0.25***
(3.38) (6.87) (0.05)
(p’-p)*W 0.02 0.04 -0.00***
(0.02) (0.04) (0.00)
High Rent 23.73*** -4.53 -0.31***
(4.06) (6.97) (0.05)
period -0.49*** 0.26** 0.00*
(0.06) (0.12) (0.00)
Constant -8.78** 38.32*** 0.48***
(3.63) (5.46) (0.04)
Observations 960 960 960
Data from matched sessions. Random effects tobit regression with candidate’s
offer as dependent variable. All regressions include subject fixed effects. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
1.6.4 How do voters behave?
Offer stage
How do voters behave when they are offered positive payments? Do they prefer one
type of payment over another one? Do the voters reject positive offers? What determines
whether voters reject a positive offer?
Figure 1.5 provides an overview of voter choice at the offer stage. Voter choice distribu-
tions in the figure are conditional on the offers where both type of payments are nonzero.
Overall, voters choose conditional payments in 66% of the observations, and voter choice
distributions are not significantly different with respect to the rent size (Pearson Chi-Square
test, p=0.074). However, since the choice of the voter depends on the offer she is presented,
and the distribution of the offers are very different in the two rent treatments, comparison
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Figure 1.5
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Data from matched sessions. NW=50 = 418 NW=200 = 437.
of these distributions leads to an incomplete picture.
Table 1.6 presents the results of regressions on the variable ”accept payment”, control-
ling for offer sizes, period, and the candidate’s expected earning. Results indicate that
voters are less likely to accept receiving payment in the high rent treatment. This finding
is also supported by the average payments rejected by the voters, presented in Figure 1.6.
Panel (a) reports average offers for which voters have chosen the option ”do not accept” at
the offer stage, excluding (UFP,CP)=(0,0), with respect to the rent size. For both up-front
and conditional payments, the average rejected payment is significantly higher in the high
rent treatment.16 Panel (b) shows that the same relationship holds for individual offers of
payments that cover the cost of voting.17
16Mann-Whitney test: (i) UFP: z=-7.48 p=0.000, (ii) CP: z=-8.40 p=0.000, (iii) E(CP): z=-8.35 p=0.000








































Data from matched sessions. NW=50 = 418 NW=200 = 437
(a) Average payments in offers for which voter has chosen ”do not accept”,








































Data from matched sessions. UFP: NW=50 = 97 NW=200 = 293. CP,
E(CP): NW=50 = 405 NW=200 = 520
(b) Average rejected payments that cover the cost of voting
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Table 1.6
Determinants of accepting payment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
UFP Offer 0.09*** 0.13*** 0.05** 0.08***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
E(CP offer) 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.01**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
(p’-p)*W 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
High Rent -0.20** -0.32*** -0.10 -0.16***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.06)
Period 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03**
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Offer cat. 3-5 0.04 0.31*
(0.25) (0.17)
Offer non-zero 1.89*** 2.12***
(0.27) (0.24)
Constant 1.09*** 0.25* -0.36 -1.17***
(0.22) (0.15) (0.29) (0.20)
Observations 960 1580 960 1580
Data Matched All Matched All
Random effects probit regression with accepting payment as dependent vari-
able. ”Offer cat. 3-5” takes on value 1 if the offer covers the cost of voting in
either of payment types, 0 if otherwise. ”Offer non-zero” takes on value 1 if
the offer is (0,0) and 0 otherwise. All regressions include subject fixed effects.
Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Voting stage
Next, I consider the behavior at the voting stage. As an overview, Figure 1.8 shows the
fraction of observations where voting has occurred, conditional on the choice at the offer
stage and the rent size. It is not surprising that the highest fraction of voting coincides
with the choice of accepting conditional payment at the offer stage – by voting, the voter
may think that she is improving her likelihood of receiving payment. However, note that
from the perspective of selfish preferences, it is impossible to explain the positive fraction
of voting; conditional on acceptance of up-front payment, voting is irrational if the voter
is selfish; conditional on acceptance of conditional payment, voting requires the voter to
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Figure 1.8
Voter choice at the voting stage,
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Data from matched sessions.
believe that the candidate is not selfish.
Table 1.7 presents the regression results on voting. First, the likelihood of voting in-
creases in both up-front and expected conditional payment offers. Moreover, having ac-
cepted some payment (either up-front or conditional payment) increases the likelihood of
voting, which provides support for the presence of guilt aversion. Not surprisingly, how-
ever, accepting up-front payment is less motivating than accepting conditional payment.
Finally, the significant negative effect of high rent is consistent with the inequity averse
voter’s utility decreasing in W.
Additionally, I analyze voting behavior conditional on accepted payment types. First,
on columns (1) and (2) in Table 1.8 I report the results of the regression results on voting,
conditional on acceptance of up-front payment. The significant effect of the size of up-
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Random effects probit regression with ”vote” as dependent variable. ”Accept”
takes on value 1 if the voter accepts either UFP or CP, 0 if otherwise. ”Accept
UFP” takes on value 1 if the voter accepts UFP and 0 otherwise. All regressions
include subject fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01.
of voter reciprocity is also supported by the significant positive effect of high rent and the
probability of winning with the vote (p’) on the likelihood of voting.
Next, on columns (3) and (4), I report the regression results on voting, conditional on
acceptance of conditional payment. The positive effect of expected conditional payment
suggests that the voters do believe the promises of the candidates. Moreover, the positive
effect of up-front payment offers (which has been rejected in favor of conditional payment)
on the likelihood of voting suggest that voters use up-front payment offer as a signal about
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the candidate’s credibility/trustworthiness. Finally, voters in the high rent treatment are
less likely to vote, which is consistent with the predicted voting behavior under inequity
aversion.
Table 1.8
Determinants of voting, conditional on accepted payment type
(1) (2) (3) (4)
UFP Offer 0.39** 0.34*** 0.07*** 0.07***
(0.19) (0.12) (0.02) (0.01)
E(CP offer) -0.01 -0.01 0.03*** 0.020***
(0.05) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
p -2.89 -4.08 -2.95*** -2.31***
(3.44) (3.16) (1.13) (0.75)
p’ 11.37** 10.95*** 2.88** 2.10**
(4.87) (3.93) (1.25) (0.82)
(p’-p)*W 0.02 -0.01 -0.00 0.00
(0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
High Rent 2.86** -0.70 -1.25*** -2.16***
(1.42) (0.74) (0.47) (0.24)
Period -0.15 -0.14* -0.08*** -0.06***
(0.10) (0.08) (0.02) (0.01)
Constant -12.81** -8.79*** -1.61*** 0.78**
(5.40) (3.40) (0.53) (0.31)
Observations‡ 43 54 516 817
Data Matched All Matched All
Conditional on UFP Accepted UFP Accepted CP Accepted CP Accepted
Random effects probit regression with ”vote” as dependent variable. All regressions in-
clude subject fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
‡Regressions exclude data from several subjects as the dependent variable ”vote” takes
only one value.
1.6.5 Transfer stage behavior of candidates
How do the candidates behave once they win? How much do candidates transfer to
their voter counterparts? To what extent do candidates keep their promises? Is candidates
decision to honor their promises affected by factors such as the size of their earnings and
voter’s contribution to the winning probability?
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Figure 1.9 provides the cumulative distribution function of the transfers made by the
candidate for each treatment. It is worth noting that candidates choose not to transfer any-
thing to the voter in 27% and 11% of the observations in the low and the high rent treat-
ments, respectively. This discrepancy also holds for transfers that do not cover the cost of
voting: in 40% and 20% of the observations, respectively, candidates make transfers less
than 10 tokens.
Given the large difference between transfer distributions in the low and high rent treat-
ments, the question of whether the higher transfers are driven by the higher promises or
simply due to having a large budget arises. Regression results reported on columns (1)
and (2) of Table 1.9 aim to answer this question. Results suggest that both factors matter;
both high rent treatment and conditional payment offers have a significant positive effect
on transfers. The former result provides support to candidate inequity aversion while the
latter result provides support to guilt aversion. Moreover, the significant positive effect of
up-front payments suggests that candidates signal their intention of making a transfer by
making positive up-front payment offers.
Finally, Figure 1.10 provides an overview to candidates’ promise-keeping behavior. It
is striking that in both treatments approximately 50% of the observations have candidates’
keeping their promises fully. Figure 1.11 provides the transfer-to-offer ratios of individual
candidates in the matched sessions, which shows that promise keeping is the predominant
feature of almost all candidates’ behavior.
To decompose the factors that motivate candidates’ to keep their promises, columns
(3) and (4) in Table 1.9 reports the results of regressions on the determinants of promise-
keeping, which is measured by the ratio of transfers to conditional payment offers. The sig-
nificant negative effect of conditional payment offer points to the fact that high conditional
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Figure 1.9
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Figure 1.10






















Data from matched sessions. NW=50 = 180 NW=200 = 210.
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Table 1.9
Determinants of transfers and promise keeping
(1) (2) (3) (4)
t t t/mCP t/mCP
UFP Offer 0.53*** 0.48*** 0.01 0.01*
(0.15) (0.14) (0.01) (0.00)
CP Offer 0.38*** 0.39*** -0.00** -0.00***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00)
p -8.32 -3.77 0.18 0.24*
(5.16) (4.85) (0.17) (0.14)
p’ 4.30 -2.52 -0.24 -0.33**
(6.06) (5.66) (0.19) (0.16)
(p’-p)*W -0.03 -0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00)
High Rent 25.74*** 65.55*** 0.69*** 1.33***
(5.59) (7.54) (0.18) (0.22)
Period -0.43*** -0.48*** -0.02*** -0.02***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant -3.25 -13.52* 0.54*** 0.09
(5.41) (7.38) (0.17) (0.21)
Observations 400 609 390 594
Data Matched All Matched All
Columns (1) and (2): Random effects tobit regression with transfer amount
as dependent variable, bounded below at 0 and above at 20+W. Columns (3)
and (4): Random effects tobit regression with ”Transfer/Offer” as dependent
variable, bounded below at 0. All regressions include subject fixed effects.
Standard errors in parentheses; * * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
payments offers are less likely to be kept by the candidates. Surprisingly, transfer-to-offer
ratio is higher for candidates in the high rent treatment. Combined with the fact that the
fraction of candidates who keep their promise fully is approximately the same in the two
rent treatments, higher transfer-to-offer ratio in the high rent treatment suggests that can-




Transfer-offer ratio of individual candidates




















































Data from matched sessions. NW=50 = 180 NW=200 = 210.
1.7 Conclusion
In this chapter I analyze different behavioral biases that enable vote buying under secret
ballot in a one-shot interaction, which is an environment economic models of selfish agents
have failed to account for the occurrence of vote buying. Whereas previous studies have
focused on the role of voter reciprocity in response to up-front payments in enabling vote
buying, I argue that inequity aversion and guilt aversion combined with the candidate’s
ability to offer up-front and conditional payments may also be salient in shaping voting
behavior, and hence facilitate vote buying.
In order to derive the implications of inequity aversion, guilt aversion and reciprocity on
vote buying, I model vote buying as a one-shot exchange between a candidate and a voter
where the candidate may make both up-front and conditional payment offers, and I allow
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the candidate and the voter to not keep their promises. I develop separate testable pre-
dictions of behavior in this game for each behavioral bias. First, if the players are inequity
averse, I show that the type of payment through which vote buying can occur depends
on the candidate’s sensitivity towards advantageous inequity. If both the candidate and
the voter are guilt averse, the type of payment through which vote buying can occur de-
pends on how the voter’s cost of not keeping her promises compares to the cost of voting; I
show that when voter’s cost is sufficiently high, vote buying can occur with both up-front
and conditional payments. Finally, if the voter is reciprocal, vote buying may only occur
though up-front payments that are considered as kind by the voter.
In a lab experiment, by varying the gains of the candidate upon winning and voter’s
influence on the voting outcome, I test the predictions of behavior of each model. My re-
sults support the presence of all three behavioral biases: inequity aversion, guilt aversion
and voter reciprocity. First, I find that vote buying occurs in a significant fraction of the
observations. This allows me to rule out selfish preferences as the sole explanation of be-
havior. Second, vote buying occurs primarily through promises, which implies that voter
reciprocity cannot be the sole behavioral bias that enables vote buying. Third, sizes of can-
didates’ offers and payments that are rejected by the voters are positively correlated with
the size of the candidate’s potential gain, which supports the presence of inequity con-
cerns in voter preferences. Fourth, for voters who have accepted up-front payment, like-
lihood of voting rises in the size of up-front payment and the candidate’s potential gain,
which provides supports to voter reciprocity. Fifth, voters who have accepted conditional
payment are more likely to vote after receiving positive up-front payment offers, which
is consistent with Guardado and Wantchékon (2016) and Kramon (2016)’s argument that
positive up-front payment may be a costly signal, in this case, the candidate’s trustwor-
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thiness/credibility. Sixth, a considerable fraction of candidates keep their promises either
fully or partially, despite not having outside enforcement for their promises. This provides
support for the presence of guilt aversion. Finally, transfer-to-promise ratio is positively cor-
related with candidate’s potential gain, which suggests that cost of not honoring a promise
may be amplified when one’s benefits accrued via that promise increase – a feature current
models of guilt aversion fail to account for.
43
Chapter 2: Vote Buying with Binding Promises
2.1 Introduction
1 Vote buying is defined as the exchange of particularized benefits (money, goods, or ser-
vices) for votes. This practice, although viewed undesirable in many voting environments,
is widespread in many societies. Examples include (but are not limited to) direct cash pay-
ments to voters in general elections, donations to a legislator’s campaign by groups and the
buying of the voting shares of a stock. In this chapter we study the optimality of pre- and
post-voting payments for buying votes in an environment where both the candidate and
the voter are able to commit to their promises, and may either be sensitive to inequity or
have different risk attitudes. We address this question by using a modified version of the
model used in Chapter 1: voter’s acceptance of an up-front or conditional payment binds
her vote and candidate’s actions. We motivate full compliance with promises with the fol-
lowing real world examples: Stokes (2005) argues that parties make use of local brokers to
imperfectly monitor voters and take advantage of repeated interaction to credibly commit
to punishing voters that do not comply. Nichter (2008) uses the same Argentinean election
data as Stokes (2005) and argues that vote buying is actually turnout buying, and hence the
problem is not moral hazard but adverse selection – if the voter’s cost of voting is compen-
sated, e.g. with providing transportation to the polling place, she can be trusted to keep
1This chapter is co-authored with Erkut Y. Ozbay.
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her promise to vote. Combinations of methods such as Tasmanian dodge,2 gift cards acti-
vated conditionally on a candidate winning(Cantú, 2016), and collective vote monitoring
by small group of voters (Rueda, 2016) may also enable voter and candidate to commit to
their promises.
In this chapter, we theoretically show that vote buying occurs exclusively via condi-
tional payment if either the players are inequity averse and the candidate’s initial budget
is sufficiently small, or the candidate is more risk averse than the voter. For the case of
inequity aversion, in comparison to up-front payment, conditional payment allows for a
larger payment to the voter (which may diminish inequality), and fixes the payment to only
one state. For the candidate, these properties make vote buying with conditional payment
more desirable than vote buying with up-front payment.On the other hand, the optimaity
of vote buying with conditional payment when the candidate is at least as risk averse as
the voter follows from optimal allocation of risk between two agents. However, we show
that, the behavioral implications of these two cases are different when the candidate’s gain
from winning is varied. While risk averse preferences imply invariance of voter behavior
to candidate’s gain, inequity aversion implies sensitivity.
We test the predictions of selfish risk neutral, selfish risk averse, and inequity averse
equilibria using a lab experiment, where we vary the gains of the candidate upon winning
and voter’s influence on the voting outcome. Our results support the presence of inequity
aversion: First, vote buying occurs less frequently than predicted by the selfish risk neutral
preferences. Second, vote buying occurs predominantly (83%) with conditional payment.
Third, for both payment types, we find a large discrepancy between the offers made by
2With this method, an unmarked ballot is stolen by a voter and delivered to the person buying votes for
marking outside the polling place. Later, the marked ballot is deposited in the ballot box by another voter, who
in turn steals a new ballot to continue the process.
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the candidates and the offers predicted by selfish risk neutral preferences. We argue that
the discrepancy for up-front payment cannot be explained by a candidate who is more or
less risk averse than the voter. Fourth, both up-front payment and conditional payment
offers are correlated to the candidate’s expected marginal gain from the vote. As this gain
rises, the candidate offers lower up-front payment and higher conditional payment. This
suggests that as the gain of the candidate rises, the candidate prefers to buy vote with con-
ditional payment, possibly because he intends to give a larger amount than what is feasible
with up-front payment. In order to convince the voter to choose conditional payment, the
candidate simultaneously decreases his up-front payment offer and increases his condi-
tional payment offer. Finally, controlling for offers, a voter is less likely to accept payment
when candidate’s expected marginal gain from her vote is higher, indicating that she de-
mands to share the benefits of her vote.
Additionally, we compare the outcomes and behavior to those under non-binding promises
(studied in Chapter 1). We find that when promises are binding, vote buying is more likely
to occur. However, the payment type used for vote buying does not vary with respect to
whether promises are binding or not. In both cases, conditional payment is used for vote
buying in at least 80% of the observations. However, the sizes of the offers vary with respect
to whether promises are binding: up-front payment offers are higher, while conditional
payment offers are lower when promises are binding. The first observation points to the
lack of trust the candidate has towards the voter, while the second observation indicates
candidate’s tendency to use cheap talk in the non-binding promises game.
This chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present the model of the vote buy-
ing with binding promises. In Section 3, we present the implications of risk aversion and
inequity aversion on equilibrium behavior. In section 4, we provide a list of testable pre-
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dictions for each theory of behavior. In Section 5, we present the experimental design, and
Section 6 the experimental results. Finally in Section 7 we offer some concluding remarks.
2.2 A Model of Vote Buying with Binding Promises
We consider a modified version of the vote buying game studied in Chapter 1: A candi-
date interacts with a voter only once, and the candidate may receive rentW > 0 with some
probability p ∈ [0, 1] The voter may affect the candidate’s chances of receiving this rent.
More specifically, suppose that if the voter votes for the candidate, then the probability of
the candidate winning W changes from p to p′ where p′ ∈ [p, 1]. The reader is referred to
Chapter 1 for the interpretation of the voter’s contribution to winning probability.
It is costly for the voter to vote. This cost is denoted by d. The candidate may offer to
compensate voter’s cost of voting, and the compensation may take two different forms: up-
front payment (UFP) and conditional payment (CP). With up-front payment, the candidate
makes an immediate transfer to the voter upon voter’s acceptance of the offer, and the voter
commits to voting. With conditional payment, the candidate commits to make a transfer
to the voter if the candidate wins W . We assume that commitment is made possible by a
technology that forces both sides to honor their promises.
We denote candidate’s offers as the pair (mUFP,mCP) ∈ R2+. Up-front payment is fi-
nanced out of candidate’s initial budget, Bc, while conditional payment is financed out of
the larger budget, (Bc + W ), with the addition of the rent. These conditions restrict the
candidate to making offers that he can fulfill.
For simplicity, we assume that the voter can accept at most one type of payment in
exchange for her vote. Additionally, we assume that players’ respective budgets (W,Bc, Bv),
the probabilities of winning with and without the voter’s vote (p and p′), and the voter’s
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cost of voting (d) are common knowledge.
The game described above is a sequential move game with perfect information with the
following timing:
1. Players observe the probability pair (p, p′) and the candidate’s rent, W .
2. The candidate presents offers (mUFP,mCP) to the voter.
3. Observing the candidate’s offer, voter chooses whether to vote for the candidate and
and if so, whether she accepts a type of payment from the candidate. If the voter
accepts up-front payment, mUFP is transferred to the voter. The cost of voting d is
deducted from the voter’s account if she chooses either to vote in exchange of some
payment or vote without accepting payment.
4. Election lottery takes place. If the voter has chosen conditional payment at the offer
stage and the candidate wins W , mCP is transferred to the voter’s account.
2.3 Theories of Behavior
In this section we present the main properties of the behavior in equilibrium under
different behavioral assumptions. Proofs of all propositions are provided in the Appendix.
We start our analysis with selfish risk neutral preferences as the baseline.
Proposition 2.1. (Selfish risk neutral preferences). Suppose both players care only about their
own material payoffs and are risk neutral. Then vote buying may occur only if (p′−p)W ≥ d. More-
over, whenever the candidate makes a nonzero offer, he offers both up-front payment and conditional
payment which are equal to the cost of voting in expectation.
The intuition behind this proposition is very simple: the voter accepts to vote only if
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at least one payment in the offer is greater than the cost of voting in expectation. If both
payments are larger than the cost of voting, she accepts the payment type that gives her
the largest expected value. Given the voter’s strategy, the candidate makes a nonzero offer
only if the expected benefit of the vote is higher than its cost, i.e. (p′ − p)W − d ≥ 0.
Since both players are risk neutral, they are indifferent between payments that are equal in
expectation.
Proposition 2.2. (Differing risk attitudes). If the candidate is more (less) risk averse than the
voter, vote buying occurs only with conditional (up-front) payment.
The intuition behind this proposition is as follows. Suppose that the candidate is risk
neutral but the voter is risk averse. Since up-front payment is riskless for the voter, any up-
front payment that is greater than the cost of voting is still acceptable, while a conditional
payment that just covers the cost of voting in expectation is no longer acceptable. Since the
candidate is risk neutral, he offers non-zero payments as long as (p′ − p)W ≥ d. However,
since voter is risk averse, if p′ < 1, then voter’s minimum acceptable conditional payment is,
in expectation, greater than her cost of voting. This makes up-front payment cheaper than
conditional payment for the candidate. As a result, the optimal offer is (mUFP ,mCP ) =
(d, 0).
Inequity Aversion
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) propose preferences that take inequity aversion concerns into
consideration. In a two player game, the utility function of player i is given by
ui(x) = xi − αi max {xj − xi, 0} − βi max {xi − xj , 0} , i, j ∈ {C, V } , i 6= j
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where xi denotes player i’s material payoff, and the parameters αi and βi measure player i’s
sensitivity to different types of inequality. More specifically, 0 < βi < 1 measures player i’s
sensitivity to advantageous inequality (i.e. when xi > xj), while αi measures player i’s sen-
sitivity to disadvantageous inequality, (i.e. when xi < xj). Fehr and Schmidt assume that
αi ≥ βi. In a game with no outcome uncertainty, player i’s utility is maximized at xj = xi.
However, in the vote buying game, players are subject to uncertainty over the outcome due
to the election process. We assume that their preferences exhibit ex-post inequity concerns,
i.e. they care about inequity in payoffs in every state of the world and weight the payoffs
from each state by its probability. This assumption is necessitated by the fact that currently
none of the expected utility models of social preferences accommodate both ex-ante and
ex-post inequity concerns.3 For simplicity, we assume that BC = BV = B, αC = αV = α
and βC = βV = β. We also assume that inequity concerns do not dominate self-interest,
i.e. α+ β < 1.
Proposition 2.3. (Inequity aversion). Suppose both players are inequity averse and their pref-
erences can be represented by Fehr-Schmidt preferences. Then, if either B < W+d2 or
d





, vote buying occurs with conditional payment only. If B ≥ W+d2 and
d





, vote buying may occur either with up-front payment or conditional payment. More-
over, the minimum accepted payment of the voter varies with W .
Note that if the voter is inequity averse and if p′ < 1, up-front payment is no longer a
safe option for her, as it is not possible to make the voter indifferent across different states.
In other words, there is always a positive probability of ex-post inequality between the
voter and the candidate. Similarly, with conditional payment, the voter always bears the
3See Fudenberg and Levine (2012) for detailed discussion.
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risk of paying for the cost of voting, but not receiving anything in return. As a result, for
each payment type, the minimum accepted amount by the voter depends on the rent of the
candidate from winning the election, W . Conditional payment fixes the payment to only
one state, and due to the larger budget, it allows for a larger payment to the voter. For the
candidate, these properties make conditional payment more desirable with respect to the
up-front payment.
2.4 Experiment
The experiment was run at the Experimental Economics Laboratory at the University
of Maryland (EEL-UMD), with 158 undergraduate students’ participation. We conducted
five sessions in May 2013 for each of the treatments, high and low rent (W = 50 and W =
200). No subject participated in more than one session. Participants were seated in isolated
booths. The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
At the beginning of each session, participants were assigned randomly to roles of either
a ”candidate” or a ”voter.” There were an equal number of candidates and voters. The roles
and candidate’s rent from winning (W ) were fixed throughout a session. In a session, each
candidate was matched randomly and anonymously to a voter in each of the 20 periods.
In each period, the candidate and the voter had the same initial endowment (B = 20),
the cost of voting was the same (d = 10), and each pair was assigned two numbers: the can-
didate’s initial probability of winning (p), and the candidate’s probability of winning if the
voter votes (p′). These numbers were drawn randomly from uniform distributions.4 5 After
both the candidate and the voter were informed about the probability pair of that round,
4p was drawn from U [0, 1], while p′ was drawn from U [p, 1].
5For each rent treatment, in three out of five sessions, the same set of (p, p′) pairs were presented to the
subjects. We refer to data from these sessions as ”matched.” For the remaining two sessions of each treatment,
the (p, p′) pairs are not matched one-to-one between rent treatments. We use the latter data only for regression
analysis.
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the candidate was asked to decide on his offers for the two possible forms of payment (up-
front and conditional payment). The voter was then informed about the candidate’s offers,
and was asked to decide to choose between four options: (i) vote without accepting pay-
ment (VwoP), (ii) vote in exchange for up-front payment (UFP), (iii) vote in exchange for
conditional payment, and (iv) do not accept payment and do not vote (DNV). If the voter
chose to vote, the election took place with the candidate’s probability of winning being p′,
otherwise the election took place with the candidate’s probability of winning being p.
Earnings in each period depended on whether the voter voted and whether she ac-
cepted an offer from the candidate, and the result of the election lottery. After all periods
were finished, one round of the 20 was chosen randomly, and the participants were paid
their earnings on that round. The participants were also paid a participation fee of $5. Par-
ticipants earned $11 on average. A copy of the instructions is provided in the Appendix.
2.5 Hypotheses
The testable predictions of each theory based on the occurrence of vote buying and
behavior of the players is given below.
Vote Buying
We define vote buying as the voter accepting some type of payment from the candidate.
Thus if the voter chooses to vote without accepting payment, vote buying does not occur.
Selfish Preferences with Risk Neutrality (RN): Vote buying occurs if and only if (p′−p)W ≥
d, and both up-front and conditional payment may be used.
Selfish Preferences with Differing Risk Attitudes (DRA): Vote buying occurs with either
up-front or conditional payment for some probability pairs (p, p′).
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Inequity Aversion: Vote buying occurs with conditional payment for some probability
pairs (p, p′). Vote buying with up-front payment does not occur due to the experi-
ment parameters: B < W+d2 , where B = 20, W ∈ {50, 200} and d = 10.
Candidate Offers
Selfish Preferences with Risk Neutrality: If (p′−p)W ≥ d, candidate makes offersmUFP =
d and mCP = d/p′.
SeSelfish Preferences with Differing Risk Attitudes: For some probability pairs (p, p′), can-
didate may make positive offers. If only up-front payment offer is positive, then
mUFP = d. Note that since subjects’ relative risk preferences are unknown, selfish
preferences with risk aversion is not able to predict which ofmCP < d/p′,mCP = d/p′,
or mCP > d/p′ will be made. However, for any given (p, p′) pair, if conditional pay-
ment offers are non-zero, then the sizes of the offers are not correlated with the can-
didate’s rent, W .
Inequity Aversion: For some probability pairs (p, p′), candidate makes positive offers in
both payment types. The size of the offers depend on the candidate’s rent, W .
Voter choice
Selfish Preferences with Risk Neutrality: Voter’s minimum acceptable up-front payment
is the cost of voting, d, and minimum acceptable conditional payment is d/p′. If she re-
ceives offers in which both amounts are greater than her minimum accepted amounts,
she chooses the payment type that has highest expected value.
Selfish Preferences with Differing Risk Attitudes: Voter’s minimum acceptable up-front
payment is the cost of voting, d, but her minimum acceptable conditional payment
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can be greater or less than d/p′. Nevertheless, voter’s minimum accepted payment
does not vary with respect to the candidate’s rent, W .
Inequity Aversion: Voter’s minimum acceptable up-front payment increases with (p′ −
p)W . While voter’s minimum acceptable conditional payment also varies with W ,
the direction of the relationship is indeterminate.
RN, DRA, Inequity Aversion on Choice of ”Vote without payment”: Voter never chooses
the option ”Vote without Accepting Payment.”
2.6 Results
In this section we analyze the data with respect to four main questions. The first two
questions are whether vote buying occurs and the conditions under which vote buying
occurs. Answers to these questions provide a description of the data as well as provide
a preliminary indication of whether inequity aversion may be present. Next, we analyze
the candidate behavior at the offer stage. Specifically, we consider the candidates’ utiliza-
tion of non-zero up-front and conditional offers, and investigate the factors behind their
decision on how much to offer. Finally, we analyze voter behavior. Specifically, we analyze
voters’ rejected offers and chosen offers, taking the offers made by the candidates as given.
When applicable, we also make comparisons with the vote buying data in Chapter 1 where
promises are not binding.
2.6.1 Does vote buying occur?
Vote buying occurs when some form of payment (up-front or conditional) is accepted
by the voter. Thus the cases in which voters choose the option ”Vote without Accepting
Payment” is not included. In the data, vote buying occurs in 58% of the observations. This
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number is significantly different from 0%.6 However, the occurrence of vote buying is sig-
nificantly lower than the percentage predicted by selfish risk neutral preferences, 65%.7
Additionally, vote buying occurs more frequently when promises are binding than when
promises are not binding (33%).8
Does the frequency of occurrence of vote buying vary with respect to the candidate’s
rent? In the low rent treatment, vote buying occurs in 55% of the observations, while in
the high rent treatment this number is 62%. Proportions test indicates that the difference
of these numbers is significantly different than zero, (z=-2.36, p=0.02), indicating a posi-
tive correlation between frequency of vote buying and candidate’s rent. Moreover, Table
2.1 reports the fraction of observations where vote buying occurs for each rent size and
provides a comparison with the outcomes for different rent levels in the vote buying game
with non-binding promises. For both games, vote buying occurs more often in the high
rent treatment. This relationship is not surprising, however, since conditional on the cost
of voting, d and the probability pair, (p, p′), higher rent loosens the participation constraint
of the candidate.
2.6.2 How does vote buying occur?
The next question is concerned with which payments vote buying occurs; up-front or
conditional payment. We find that vote buying occurs predominantly via conditional pay-
ment (83%). This number is significantly different than 50.%9 The predominant use of con-
ditional payment supports either the inequity aversion hypothesis, or the differing risk
attitudes hypothesis where the candidate is more risk averse than the voter.
6Binomial test, H0 : p(vb) = 0.05, prob = 0.000. Here, 0.05 allows for the subjects’ possibility of making
errors.
7Binomial test, H0 : p(vb) = 0.65, prob(p(vb) 6= 0.65) = 0.000.
8Proportions test, H0 : p(vbBinding) = p(vbNon-binding), z=-11.41, p = 0.000
9Binomial test: H0 : p(CP |vb = 1) = 0.5, prob(p(CP |vb = 1) 6= 0.5) = 0.000.
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Table 2.1
Fraction of observations where vote buying occurs w.r.t. Rent
Low High Proportions
(W=50) (W=200) Test∗
Binding Promises .55 .62 z=-2.36
(0.02) (0.02) p=0.018




Data from matched sessions. Standard errors in parentheses.
NB50=NB200=NNB50=NNB200=480, where B: Binding, NB: Non-
binding, 50: W=50, and 200: W=200.
∗ Two-sided test
Table 2.2
Fraction of observations where vote buying occurs with conditional payment
Low High Proportions
W=50 W=200 Test∗
Binding Promises 0.82 0.85 z=-0.79
(0.02) (0.02) p=0.429




Data from matched sessions. Standard errors in parentheses.
NB50=140, NB200=299, NNB50=263, NNB200=173, where B: Bind-
ing, NB: Non-binding, 50: W=50, and 200: W=200.
∗ Two-sided test
Table 2.2 reports the fraction of observations where conditional payment is used for vote
buying with respect to the candidate’s rent, and also provides comparison values from the
non-binding promises game. In the low rent treatment, conditional payment is chosen in
82% of the observations where the voter accepts some payment. In the high rent treatment,
this number is slightly higher at 85%. Two sample proportions test indicates that the dif-
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ference of these frequencies is not statistically different from zero. In comparison, for the
non-binding promises game, conditional payment is used more frequently in the high rent
treatment. However, we find that, for a given value of candidate’s rent, the frequency of
vote buying with conditional payment is not statistically different between the cases where
promises are binding and promises are not binding.
2.6.3 How do candidates make offers?
In this section we analyze the offers made by the candidates. Particularly, we consider
whether candidates make offers that are positive in both payment types or choose to make
a positive offer in only one payment type. Second, we consider whether the offers compen-
sate for the cost of voting and whether positive offers vary with respect to the candidate’s
rent.
In Figure 2.1, offers are classified with respect to whether the payments cover the cost
of voting, and if so, which type of payment covers the cost of voting. The distributions of
offers with respect to this classification are significantly different between the two levels
of rent.10 Notice that the offers in the first two categories do not cover the cost of voting
in either of the payment types, up-front or conditional payment. Hence, the share of the
offers that do not cover the cost of voting is 32% for the low rent treatment and 20% for
the high rent treatment. In contrast, these numbers are higher in the non-binding promises
game: 44% for the low rent treatment and 36% for the high rent treatment.
The offers in the last three offer categories cover the cost of voting in either up-front or
conditional payments, or both. For these categories, the first thing to notice is candidates’
preference for two types of offers: those that cover the cost of voting only in conditional
payment, and those that cover the cost of voting in both payment types. The offers in these
10Pearson Chi-Square test, chi2(4)=19.33 p=0.001.
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Figure 2.1








































UFP=0, E(CP)=0 0<UFP<10, 0<E(CP)<10 UFP>=10, E(CP)<10 UFP<10, E(CP)>=10 UFP>=10, E(CP)>=10
Non-binding promises
Data from matched sessions.
two categories account for 60% of the offers made by the candidates. In contrast, when
promises are not binding, candidates use offers of the former type predominantly (approx-
imately 40% of offers). This difference between binding and non-binding promises cases are
not surprising, however, since when promises are not binding, the other player not keep-
ing his promise is an additional risk factor. In this case, candidates use their first mover’s
advantage to make offers that are less risky for them.
How does the distribution of the offers compare to the selfish preference risk neutral
equilibrium? Figure 2.2 provides empirical and predicted cumulative distributions of up-
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Figure 2.2
Empirical and predicted distributions of offers
(a) Up-front payment (b) Conditional payment
front and conditional payment offers. The large discrepancies between the empirical and
predicted distribution clearly show that selfish risk neutral preferences do not approximate
the behavior in the vote buying game well. Note also that while the differing risk attitudes
with risk averse players and candidate more risk averse than the voter can explain the em-
pirical cumulative distribution of conditional payment being below the risk neutral equilib-
rium predicted distribution for all payment levels, the both players being risk averse cannot
account for the observed up-front payment distribution, since its prediction overlaps with
that of risk neutral equilibrium for up-front payments.
Next, we consider the average size of offers with respect to the rent. Table 2.3 reports the
average offers conditional on (i) the offers being non-zero, and (ii) the offers compensating
the cost of voting. Notice that except for the up-front payments that cover the cost of vot-
ing, average offers in each payment type is significantly higher in the high rent treatment.
It is also worth noting that the ratio of conditional payment offer to candidate’s budget af-
ter winning, (B + W ), declines as rent increases. Hence, although conditional payment
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offers are positively correlated to the rent, there is no universal offer-to-budget ratio that
candidates use as a rule of thumb when making conditional payment offers.
We also consider whether promises being binding makes a difference. We find that, on
average, non-zero up-front payment offer is higher in binding promises game, for both rent
levels.11 However, for up-front payment offers greater than the cost of voting, the difference
between binding promises and non-binding promises game vanishes.12 This suggests that
candidates who offer up-front payments greater than the cost of voting (mUFP ≥ d) in the
non-binding promises game trust the voters to keep their promise of voting.
Additionally, on average, conditional payment offers that are greater than the cost of
voting in expectation (p′mCP ≥ d) are higher in non-binding promises game.13 This might
be indicative of candidate cheap talk in the non-binding promises game.
What factors do candidates take into consideration when they decide on the size of their
offers? Tobit regressions presented in Table 2.4 give a detailed account of candidates’ offer
making behavior. In the regressions, in addition to the exogenous variables p, p′ and W ,
we include the variables RNE(UFP) and RNE(CP), up-front and conditional payment of-
fers predicted by selfish risk neutral preferences, to find out whether candidate’s rent size
can explain the discrepancy between the actual offers and risk neutral equilibrium predic-
tions. We find that candidates take the probabilities (p, p′) into consideration as expected,
but their decision is also affected by the expected marginal benefit of vote, (p′−p)W , when
deciding how much to offer. Furthermore, the expected marginal benefit of the vote seems
to create a substitution between up-front payment and conditional payment offer sizes: as
the benefit increases, candidates offer higher amounts for conditional payment and lower
11Mann-Whitney Test, W=50: z=-7.37, p=0.000, W=200: z=-2.26, p=0.02
12Mann-Whitney Test, W=50: z=-1.91, p=0.06, W=200: z=-0.28, p=0.77
13Mann-Whitney Test, W=50: z=3.16, p=0.002, W=200: z=2.45, p=0.01
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Table 2.3
Average offers w.r.t Rent Size
Mann -Whitney Observations
W=50 W=200 U-test (N50, N200)
(i) If offer is UFP 11 11.37 z = -2.70 (247, 284)
positive* (0.33) (0.31) p = 0.007
E(CP) 16.66 28.29 z = -7.42 (389, 407)
(0.53) (0.97) p = 0.000
CP/(B+W) .31 .17 z = 8.74
(0.01) (0.01) p = 0.000
(ii) If offer covers UFP 13.11 13.61 z = -1.87 (187, 215)
cost of voting** (0.29) (0.27) p = 0.06
E(CP) 20.07 33.67 z = -10.49 (292, 327)
(0.57) (1.01) p = 0.000
CP/(B+W) .36 .21 z = 13.65
(0.01) (0.01) p = 0.000
Data from matched sessions. Standard errors in parentheses.
*For conditional payment, expected value of the offer must be positive.
**For conditional payment, expected value of the offer must cover the cost of voting.
amounts for up-front payment, possibly to encourage voters to choose conditional pay-
ment, which they favor.
Next, we investigate the effect of binding promises on the behavior of the candidates.
Tobit regressions presented in Table 2.5 include a dummy variable that takes on the value
1 if promises are binding and 0 otherwise. Results confirm the pattern observed in the
matched data averages: when promises are binding, up-front payments are higher and
conditional payments are lower on average.
2.6.4 How do voters behave?
In this section we consider how voters behave, taking candidates’ offers as given. More
specifically, we are interested in how voters behave when they are offered positive pay-
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Table 2.4
Determinants of offer size, Binding Promises
(1) (2) (3) (4)
mUFP mUFP mCP mCP
p -14.73*** -16.62*** -12.54*** -17.47***
(3.34) (2.79) (4.52) (3.69)
p’ 22.64*** 22.71*** 6.82 10.75***
(3.54) (2.93) (4.59) (3.74)
W -0.01 -0.04* 0.24*** 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
(p’-p)W -0.04** -0.05*** 0.10*** 0.10***





Period -0.05 -0.10** -0.13 -0.03
(0.05) (0.04) (0.08) (0.07)
Constant -4.47 -5.97* -7.59 12.86***
(2.96) (3.11) (5.00) (4.71)
Observations 960 1580 960 1580
Log likelihood -1829.57 -2881.96 -3349.72 -5296.78
Data Matched All Matched All
Random effects tobit regression with candidate’s offer as dependent variable.
All regressions include subject fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses; *
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
ments. Do voters prefer one type of payment over the other? Do they reject offers greater
than the cost of voting? If so, what determines their decision to reject?
Figure 2.4 provides the distribution of voter choice for the subset of offers that exclude
zero payments in both payment types. First, we notice that there are some voters who
choose the option ”vote without accepting payment,” which is not predicted by any of the
theories we have considered. However, since these voters constitute 2% of the data, we
find these observations negligible. Overall, voters choose conditional payment in 60% of
the observations where at least one payment type offers a non-zero amount. Moreover the
62
Table 2.5
Determinants of offer size
(1) (2) (3) (4)
mUFP mUFP mCP mCP
p -16.76*** -17.55*** -25.99*** -26.14***
(2.04) (1.68) (3.75) (3.04)
p’ 20.47*** 21.47*** 8.13* 11.70***
(2.31) (1.90) (4.17) (3.37)
W 0.10*** 0.04** -0.05 0.25***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
(p’-p)W -0.03* -0.03*** 0.05** 0.09***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02)
Binding Promises 7.66*** -1.65 -31.12*** -6.99
(2.96) (2.96) (5.96) (6.04)
Period -0.25*** -0.30*** 0.06 0.23***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.07) (0.06)
Constant -11.63*** -3.75 42.66*** 10.11
(3.21) (2.91) (6.05) (6.19)
Observations 1920 3160 1920 3160
Log Likelihood -3354.19 -5408.31 -7124.81 -11609.67
Data Matched All Matched All
Random effects tobit regression with candidate’s offer as dependent variable.
All regressions include subject fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses; *
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
distribution of voter choice varies with respect to the candidate’s rent.14 The difference
stems from the substitution towards ”vote with conditional payment” from ”do not vote”
when candidate’s rent rises. However, since the choice of the voter depends on the offer
she is presented, and the distribution of the offers have been shown to be different in the
two rent treatments, comparison of these distributions leads to an incomplete picture.
The average payments rejected by the voters are presented in Figure 2.5. Panel (a) shows
the average offers for which voters have chosen the option ”do not vote”, excluding offers
(mUFP ,mCP )=(0,0), with respect to the rent size. While for up-front payment the average
rejected payment is significantly higher in the high rent treatment, for conditional and ex-
14Pearson Chi-Square test, chi2(3)=58.24, p=0.000
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Figure 2.4
















Vote w/o payment Vote w/ UFP Vote w/ CP DNV
W=50
W=200
Data from matched sessions. NW=50 = 398 NW=200 = 431.
pected conditional payments, the difference in rejected non-zero payments between high
and low rent treatments is not significantly different than zero.15 However, panel (b) shows
that when an offer covers the cost of voting for a given payment type, the average rejected
up-front payment for high and low rent treatments are virtually the same, while the aver-
age rejected conditional and expected conditional payments are significantly higher when
the rent is high.16
Table 2.6 presents the results of regressions on the variables ”accept payment”, ”accept
up-front payment”, and ”accept conditional payment”, controlling for offer sizes, winning
probabilities, period, candidate’s expected marginal benefit from the vote, and behavior
predicted by selfish risk neutral preferences. Results indicate that voters are more likely
to accept payment in the high rent treatment, but their likelihood of accepting payment
15Mann-Whitney test: (i) UFP: z=-2.85 p=0.004, (ii) CP: z=-0.35 p=0.73, (iii) E(CP): z=-1.63 p=0.10




(a) Average payments in offer pairs for which voter has chosen ”do not vote”,
excluding offers (UFP, CP)=(0,0)
 
Data from matched sessions. NW=50 = 130 NW=200 = 121
(b) Average rejected payments that cover the cost of voting
 Data from matched sessions. UFP: NW=50 = 28 NW=200 = 46. CP, E(CP):
NW=50 = 57 NW=200 = 61
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Table 2.6




UFP offer 0.08*** 0.16*** -0.19***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
E(CP offer) 0.07*** -0.13*** 0.12***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
p -0.86* -1.22 0.35
(0.48) (0.94) (0.78)
p’ 0.52 1.70 -1.28
(0.53) (1.06) (0.88)
(p’-p)W -0.01*** -0.01 0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
W 0.01** 0.02** -0.01**
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01)






Constant -2.96*** -1.48* 2.28***
(0.65) (0.90) (0.84)
Observations 960 485 520
Log likelihood -367.42 -91.05 -123.52
Data from matched sessions. Random effects probit regression with accepting
payment as dependent variable. All regressions include subject fixed effects.
Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
decreases in candidate’s expected marginal benefit from the vote. This finding provides
support for the presence of inequity concerns: as the voter’s contribution to the candidate’s
expected gain rises, the more likely the voter is to withold her vote.
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we study the optimality of pre- and post-voting payments for buying
votes in an environment where both the candidate and the voter are able to commit to
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their promises. Using a modified version of the vote buying model used in Chapter 1,
we investigate the implications of different risk attitudes and inequity aversion on agent
behavior. Our theoretical result establishes conditional payment as the sole payment type
used for vote buying if either the players are inequity averse and the candidate’s initial
budget is sufficiently small, or the candidate is more risk averse than the voter.
We test the predictions of selfish risk neutral, selfish risk averse, and inequity averse
equilibria using a lab experiment. Our main treatment variables, the rent of the candidate
upon winning and voter’s influence on the voting outcome, allow us to have distinguishing
predictions for each model. Our results support the presence of inequity aversion: First,
vote buying occurs less frequently than predicted by the selfish risk neutral preferences.
Second, vote buying occurs predominantly (83%) with conditional payment. Third, for
both payment types, we find a large discrepancy between the offers made by the candi-
dates and the offers predicted by selfish risk neutral preferences. We argue that the dis-
crepancy for up-front payment cannot be explained by a candidate who is more or less risk
averse than the voter. Fourth, both up-front payment and conditional payment offers are
correlated to the candidates’ expected marginal gain from the vote. As this gain rises, can-
didates offer lower up-front payment and higher conditional payment. This suggests that
as the gain of the candidates rises, candidates prefer to buy vote with conditional payment,
possibly because they intend to give a larger amount than what is feasible with the their
initial budget. In order to convince the voters to choose conditional payment, candidates
simultaneously decrease their up-front payment offers and increase their conditional pay-
ment offers. Finally, controlling for offers, voters are less likely to accept payment when
candidates’ expected marginal gain from the vote is higher, indicating that they demand to
share the benefits of their vote.
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Additionally, we compare the outcomes and behavior in binding and non-binding promises
games (studied in Chapter 1). We find that when promises are binding, vote buying is more
likely to occur. However, the payment type used for vote buying does not vary with respect
to whether promises are binding or not. In both games, conditional payment is used for
vote buying in at least 80% of the observations. However, offer sizess vary with respect to
whether promises are binding: up-front payment offers are higher, while conditional pay-
ment offers are lower when promises are binding. The first observation points to the lack of
trust the candidates in non-binding game have for the voters, while the second observation
suggests that candidates’ engage in cheap talk in the non-binding promises game.
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Chapter 3: Anticipated Guilt and Cost of Reciprocation
3.1 Introduction
There is a large body of evidence that indicates a significant number of people are mo-
tivated by fairness and reciprocity, and that presence of such people may have important
economic effects (Fehr and Gächter, 1998, 2000; Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1986; So-
bel, 2005). In this chapter I study whether a decision maker ever turns down a beneficial
offer from another player, and if so, under what conditions she does.
One may think of several scenarios where this might occur. For example, consider the
case where Ann is invited to lunch at a nice restaurant by an acquaintance. If she suspects
that she will be asked a favor at the lunch, she may decide to turn down the offer if she an-
ticipates the favor to be something she does not want to do. As a second example, consider
Bob, whose friend gives him a very expensive gift. If Bob’s budget is tight, he may decline
the gift as he knows that he cannot reciprocate the gift by returning something of similar
value, despite knowing that the gift giver does not expect something in return.
The behavior of the decision makers in these examples may be explained by the follow-
ing behavioral biases: guilt aversion, reciprocity and inequity aversion. Ann’s behavior can
be modeled by guilt aversion because she anticipates that if she attends the lunch, she will
hear about the favor her acquaintance will ask. But, while she will not fulfill the expectation
of her acquaintance, she will also feel guilt of not doing the favor. In contrast, Bob’s behav-
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ior may be explained by either positive reciprocity or inequity aversion. Positive reciprocity
predicts Bob to reject because he will be unable to be kind to a person who he perceives as
being kind to him. If Bob cares about equity, accepting the gift but not being able to give
something with similar value back would also result in Bob rejecting the gift.
In order to formalize and refine the predictions of these biases, I modify the trust game,
introduced first by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995)1 to study trust and reciprocity, and
used extensively in different forms for testing other-regarding preferences. In a typical trust
game, both players have the same initial endowment. First mover has the opportunity to
send money to second mover, where the amount of money sent is multiplied by a num-
ber greater than one (typically three) when being transferred to the second mover. Then,
second mover gets the opportunity to send money back to the first mover, which is trans-
ferred one-ton-one to the first mover, after which the game ends. In this study, I modify
the trust game in four dimensions. First, I allow the second mover to decline a transfer
from the first mover. However, in contrast to the impunity game (Bolton and Zwick, 1995)
where rejection results in money burning, in my game, second mover’s rejection results in
the amount rejected to be returned to the first mover. Second, I vary the second mover’s
cost of reciprocation by varying the amount transferred to the first mover when the sec-
ond mover sends back one unit of money back to the first mover. I call this amount as the
second mover’s transfer rate, and the higher the second mover’s transfer rate, the lower is
her cost of reciprocation. Third, I assume the second mover’s transfer rate is her private in-
formation. Finally, to simplify analysis, I restrict the first mover to make a binary decision
between sending all of his endowment to the second mover and keeping his endowment.
1In their paper Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe call this game the ”investment” game, and liken it to the ”trust”
game of Kreps (1990) and the centipede game of Rosenthal (1981) in that passing money to the other player is
risky but leads to an expanded pie, some of which may be returned. The differences between Berg, Dickhaut,
and McCabe’s game and these games lies in the repeated nature and the limited choices at each stage of the
games in Kreps (1990); Rosenthal (1981).
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The combination of these modifications allows me to derive distinct testable predictions
for the behavioral biases considered over second mover’s decisions on rejection and giving
back.
In my theoretical analysis, I first assume that the second mover is inequity averse, i.e.
she bears a utility cost when payoffs are not equitable. I use Fehr and Schmidt (1999)’s
inequity aversion model and show that both the second mover’s likelihood of rejection and
giving back weakly decreases in her transfer rate.
Next, I assume that the second mover is guilt averse, i.e. she bears a utility cost when
she believes that she has let the first mover down. I show that, given her belief about
first mover’s payoff expectation, second mover’s likelihood of rejection decreases in sec-
ond mover’s transfer rate. I also show that second mover’s likelihood of rejection increases
in her belief over first mover’s payoff expectation. Moreover, conditional on accepting, sec-
ond mover’s giving back weakly decreases in her transfer rate and increases in her belief
about first mover’s payoff expectation.
Finally, I assume that second mover is reciprocal and she estimates the first mover’s
kindness based on how her belief about first mover’s payoff expectation compares to a ”fair”
payoff for the first mover. Additionally, I assume that rejection absolves the second mover
from reciprocation concerns as she does not receive the benefit of the first mover’s action. To
the best of my knowledge, this last assumption is novel for reciprocal preferences. I specify
a general form of the utility function that satisfies these properties and show that likelihood
of rejection weakly decreases in second mover’s transfer rate. Furthermore, there is a non-
linear relationship between second mover’s belief about first mover’s payoff expectation
and her likelihood of rejection.
I test the theoretical predictions of the three behavioral biases in an experiment where
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I vary the second movers’ transfer rate and collect information on second movers’ beliefs
about first movers’ payoff expectations. My results support the presence of both guilt aver-
sion and reciprocity. First, I find that a significant proportion of second movers (47%) reject
non-zero transfers from first movers. Second, second movers’ likelihood of rejection de-
creases in their transfer rate and is higher when the second movers are unable to transfer
to the first mover their stated beliefs about first movers’ payoff expectation. Third, sec-
ond movers’ giving back decreases in their transfer rate, and on average lower when sec-
ond movers are unable to transfer their stated belief about first movers’ payoff expectation.
However, the transfers first movers receive back from second movers increase in second
movers’ transfer rate, suggesting that second movers’ giving back is price inelastic. In a sub-
sample where the second movers are able to transfer their stated beliefs to the first mover, I
also find evidence of non-linear relationship between second movers’ giving back and their
stated beliefs about first movers’ payoff expectation.
Finally, an unexpectedly large fraction of first movers choose to send their endowments
(73%) to the second mover, without knowing second mover’s transfer rate. In an additional
treatment where the first mover can also condition his decision on second mover’s transfer
rate, I find that first movers’ likelihood of sending increases in second movers’ transfer rate.
This finding suggests that first movers may be correctly anticipating the behavior of second
movers, but further research with an experiment design that collects first movers’ beliefs is
necessary.
Trust Game and Related Literature
Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) and later studies of the trust game2 find that an
overwhelming majority of first movers send positive amounts to second movers, and while
2See Cooper and Kagel (2013) for an overview of results.
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there is considerable variability across the money sent, on average, first movers send half of
their endowment. Moreover, second movers respond positively to the amount sent by first
movers by sending back higher amounts as the first movers’ transfer increases. However,
on average, the amount sent back by second movers is less than the amount sent by first
movers. Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe argue that the amount sent by first mover signals his3
trust (and belief in reciprocity), and a second mover with ”a predisposition to reciprocate
may be more willing to reciprocate when they believe their counterpart shares a common
regard for trust”, likening their conception of trust to Rabin (1993)’s conception of ”kind-
ness.” Indeed, Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) and later studies find that first movers’
investment pay off when they send high fractions of their endowments to second movers
(and take more risk by doing so).
The findings on the second movers’ responsiveness to how much risk first mover takes
has been called as the self-fulfilling property of trust by Bacharach, Guerra, and Zizzo
(2007), who argue that perceptions of kindness increase trust responsiveness. For mod-
eling trust and reciprocity, a common approach has been to use the tools of psychological
game theory,4 where a decision maker’s utility depends on her belief about other players’
beliefs about all players’ choices. In the context of the trust game, second mover’s belief
on the payoff expectation of the first mover (which is linked to first mover’s beliefs on sec-
ond mover’s behavior) may play a role in her decision to how much to send back to the first
mover. This belief of the second mover has been called second mover’s second-order belief.
Using the second-order belief, Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) introduce the notion
of ”guilt aversion” and modify the trust game to include chance moves to contend that
3I will refer to the first mover as ”he” and second mover as ”she” in this chapter.
4Pyschological game theory has been introduced by Geanakoplos, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1989) and later
generalized to include dynamic games by Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009)
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higher orders of beliefs factor in second mover’s decision to take a costly action to give first
mover a chance of a high payoff. Since guilt may arise from a person’s failure to live up to
expectations of others (Baumeister, Stillwell, and Heatherton, 1994), models of guilt aver-
sion (such as Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007)) typically incorporate second-order belief
of the decision maker into her utility by adding payoff deviations from the second-order
belief as a cost. Thus, in the context of the trust game, a guilt averse second mover’s giving
back would weakly increase in her belief about first mover’s payoff expectation. Indeed,
Charness and Dufwenberg show that many second movers trade off their material benefits
for the potential let-down their behavior may cause to the first mover.
Reciprocity may also be captured through incorporating second-order beliefs into util-
ity. Since reciprocity is based on the idea that people would like to be (un)kind to peo-
ple who are (un)kind to them, Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009) show that the essence of
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004)’s model of sequential reciprocity can be captured in a
model where kindness of other players are defined using the second mover’s second-order
beliefs about them. This approach captures the intentions notion: the decision maker’s
judgment about the sincerity of another player’s action that provides benefits to the deci-
sion maker depends on whether she believes the other player is trying to take advantage
of her reciprocal nature, i.e. acting strategically kind. Hence, in the context of the trust
game, a reciprocal second mover’s giving back may decrease in her belief about the first
mover’s payoff expectation – if second mover thinks that the first mover is manipulating
the second mover to achieve a high return, the second mover may decide to be unkind to
the first mover by sending nothing back.
This study contributes to the literature on the behavioral biases of guilt aversion and
reciprocity. A majority of the existing studies on reciprocity focus on environments when
74
a player is either (i) the initiator of a chain of pro–social actions, or (ii) a receiver of benefits
of pro-social actions, but not given a choice to decline them (although they might prefer to
do so) and are asked to make their decisions based on kindness that is pushed onto them.5
Although reciprocity/trust is an ”important lubricant of a social system” (Arrow, 1974), not
allowing the recipients to opt out may bias results in favor of the effectiveness of reciprocity.
Second, this study contributes to the debate on how second-order beliefs may affect be-
havior. Currently there is no consensus in the literature on how second-order beliefs may
enter the utility of the decision maker. On one side are the studies that support intentions-
based reciprocity by providing evidence of negative correlation between second-order be-
liefs and giving/giving back (Bacharach, Guerra, and Zizzo, 2007; Guerra and Zizzo, 2004;
Stanca, Bruni, and Corazzini, 2009; Toussaert, 2017); while on the other side are the studies
that provide evidence of positive correlation in favor of guilt aversion (Bellemare, Sebald,
and Strobel, 2011; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Khalmetski, 2016); and yet on another
side, there are studies that provide evidence for no correlation (Al-Ubaydli and Lee, 2012;
Ellingsen, Johannesson, Tjøtta, and Torsvik, 2010; Engler, Kerschbamer, and Page, 2016;
Strassmair, 2009; Vanberg, 2008). Finally, Regner and Harth (2014) argue for an inverse U-
shaped relationship between second-order beliefs and giving back: for low second order
beliefs, giving back increases in second-order belief, while it decreases for high second-
order beliefs. It should also be noted that Regner and Harth interpret the former as the
region where guilt aversion dominates, while the latter as the region where negative reci-
procity dominates. However, one may think that the inverse U-shape can also be produced
with reciprocity only: in the first region, because the second-order belief of the decision
maker is lower than a ”fair” level, the decision maker perceives the other player as kind.
5In the impunity game the second mover has the option to decline, but after this decision, she does not have
any futher actions.
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Thus she is compelled to act kind towards the other player in the first region, which would
produce a positive correlation between giving back and second-order belief. In this study, I
propose a utility function that satisfies this intuition, however, I argue that while it is useful
for explaining why a second mover may decline a transfer from the first mover, it does not
have predictive power for second mover’s interior giving back decisions. Nevertheless, my
experimental results are consistent with a non-linear relationship between second mover
second-order beliefs and second mover giving back.
I proceed as follows. In Section 2, I present the modified trust game and discuss the
three different behavioral biases that may account for second mover’s rejection of a transfer
from the first mover. In section 3, I present the experimental procedures. This is followed by
a list of testable predictions under each behavioral bias in Section 4. In Section 5, I present
the experimental results and finally in Section 6, I offer some concluding remarks.
3.2 Theories of Behavior
3.2.1 Mini Trust Game with Second Mover Rejection
I consider a one-shot sequential interaction of two players, A and B. The players have
identical initial endowments (BA = BB = 100). Player A moves first, and decides between
keeping his endowment and sending all of it to Player B. If Player A decides to send his
endowment to Player B, Player B decides between accepting and rejecting the transfer from
Player A. If Player B rejects the transfer, Player A receives his transfer back and the game
ends with both players keeping their initial endowments. If Player B accepts the transfer,
she receives Player A’s endowment multiplied by three and gets the opportunity to send
money back to Player A. Player B can choose any amount b ∈ [0, 400] to send back. While
being transferred, the amount Player B decides to send back to Player A is multiplied by
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Figure 3.1
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Player B’s transfer rate (k ≥ 0) and the game ends with the monetary payoffs πA = kb and
πB = 400− b. This game is depicted in Figure 3.1.
The most important modifications to the original trust game are (i) the ability of Player
B to reject tokens from Player A and the rejection leading to both players returning to their
initial payoff positions; and (ii) the variation in Player B’s transfer rate.6 The first modifi-
cation adds elements of the impunity game ((Bolton, Katok, and Zwick, 1998; Bolton and
Zwick, 1995)) to the dynamic. However, in contrast to the impunity game, in my game,
rejection does not result in money burning: if Player B rejects a transfer from Player A, the
amount is returned to Player A. The second modification borrows its intuition from the re-
lationship between giving and the cost of giving in Andreoni and Miller (2002). However,
the dictator in my game (Player B) has a history with the other player.
Under assumptions of different behavioral biases, it is possible for Player B to reject a
transfer from Player A. For example, consider the case where k = 0, i.e. any amount Player
6Player B’s transfer rate being private information is a simplifying assumption, since, otherwise, Player
B’s second-order beliefs may also depend on her transfer rate k. Thus any analysis would require further
assumptions on how Player B forms her second-order beliefs. While this is an interesting research question,
since this study is about how beliefs may affect behavior, the added complexity would be out of scope of this
study.
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B decides to give back to Player A will be burned. Then, I show below that, conditional on
accepting, an inequity averse Player B sends back zero tokens.7
3.2.2 Behavioral predictions
In this section I present the main properties of Player B’s optimal behavior in the game
equilibria under various behavioral assumptions. I start with selfish preferences as the
baseline.
Proposition 3.1. (Selfish preferences). Suppose Player B cares only about her own material payoff.
Then, for all values of k ≥ 0, Player B accepts Player A’s transfer and give back zero to Player A.
Inequity aversion
Suppose Player B cares about equal splitting of the surplus. In this case, her preferences
may be represented with the utility function proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). In the
context of the trust game, utility of Player B is given by
uB(πB, πA) = πB − αmax {πA − πB, 0} − βmax {πB − πA, 0} (3.1)
where πi, i ∈ {A,B} indicate material payoffs and the parameters α and β measure
PlayerB’s sensitivity to disadvantageous and advantageous inequity, respectively. Follow-
ing Fehr and Schmidt, I assume β ≤ α and 0 ≤ β < 1. These parameter assumptions imply
that Player B bears higher utility cost for inequity in cases where the material inequity is to
her disadvantage (B’s payoff is lower than A’s payoff) than to cases where the inequity is to
her advantage (B’s payoff is higher than A’s payoff).
7For inequity aversion, I follow Fehr and Schmidt (1999)’s restrictions on sensitivity to advantageous in-
equality and assume that players are not extremely inequity averse such that they would burn money.
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The equilibrium behavior under inequity aversion can be summarized by Player B’s
sensitivity to advantageous utility, β, and how it relates to her transfer rate, k. Her decisions
on acceptance and transfer can be characterized by the following proposition, whose proof
is provided in the Appendix.
Proposition 3.2. (Inequity aversion). If Player B is inequity averse, she may optimally decline a
transfer from Player A. More specifically, if
(i) β ≤ 34 and β <
1









, where k < 13 . then Player B rejects Player A’s transfer;






The intuition behind these thresholds are as follows. First, the threshold value of 1k+1
governs Player B’s giving back behavior, and is due to Player B’s comparison of keeping one
extra dollar to herself or sending the extra dollar to Player A (in which case the dollar gets
multiplied by k), when her material payoff is higher than that of Player A. While keeping the
dollar to herself increases Player B’s utility by (1−β), sending the dollar to Player B results
in a utility gain of βk units. Second, the threshold value of 34 is due to Player B’s comparison
of accepting vs. rejecting a transfer from Player A, when she knows that if she accepts, she
will not give anything back to Player A. In the case that she accepts, the material payoffs
will be very unequal ((πA, πB) = (0, 400)). This may be tolerated only by a Player B who
is sufficiently insensitive to advantageous inequity. Finally, notice that, Player B’s optimal




Suppose Player B cares about living up to the expectations of Player A. In this case, her
preferences should depend on how her actions measure up to the expectations of Player
A, but since there is not an opportunity for Player A to relay what he expects Player B
to do, Player B is left on her own to guess this expectation. Such a situation is captured
by Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007)’s model of simple guilt, where a player cares about
whether and how much she lets another player down. In the context of the trust game with
private information, utility of guilt averse Player B has the following general form:
uB(sB; sA, eB) = πB(sA, sB)− Φ max {πA(sA, sB)− eB, 0} (3.2)
where πi(sA, sB), i ∈ {A,B} indicate material payoffs resulting from strategies sA and sB ,
Φ ≥ 0 is a coefficient reflecting guilt sensitivity, and eB is Player B’s belief about Player A’s
payoff expectation. Thus, max {πA(sA, sB)− eB, 0} gives Player B’s guilt.
Proposition 3.3. (Guilt aversion). If Player B is guilt averse, she may decline a transfer from
Player A, i.e. there exists k ≥ 0, eB ≥ 0 and Φ ≥ 0 such that utility of rejecting is higher than
accepting a transfer from Player A. Moreover, Player B’s utility difference between accepting and
rejecting weakly increases in k and weakly decreases in eB . For some eB , this utility difference is
lower when Player B cannot transfer eB to Player A than when she can transfer eB to Player A. If
Player B accepts, her giving back weakly decreases in k and weakly increases in eB .
The intuition behind this proposition is as follows. First, whether Player B sends any-
thing back to Player A conditional on accepting is governed by her guilt sensitivity, Φ and
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her transfer rate, k. If Φk ≥ 1, then, upon accepting, Player B sends a positive amount back
to Player A. Ideally in this case, Player B prefers to send back an amount that is equal to her
second order belief when it is transferred to Player A, i.e. send b such that kb = eB . How-
ever, if her transfer rate is low such that transferring her second order belief is infeasible
(400k < eB), Player B will choose to send all of her tokens to Player A. Whether Player B
prefers to choose this route or reject a transfer from Player A depends on how her second-
order belief compares to Player A’s initial endowment. For example, if her second order
beliefs are high (eB > 100) and her transfer rate is very low such that 400k < eB then
what she can transfer to Player A will create a higher disappointment than if she declines
(eB − 400k > eB − 100). Such a case would occur, for instance, if k < 1/4.
Reciprocity
Now suppose that Player B is reciprocal, i.e. she prefers to respond pro-socially to kind-
ness, and anti-socially to unkindness. Ideally, when judging the kindness of an action, a
decision maker would consider (i) the resulting allocations, (ii) how the allocations came
into being (e.g. Blount (1995)), (iii) the menu of choices available at the time, and (iv) in-
tentions. Since Player A has a binary choice in the modified trust game, like in the case of
guilt aversion, Player B is left on her own to guess what Player A may be expecting. Based
on this expectation and a reference payoff, Player B can decide whether, by sending his en-
dowment, Player A has been kind to Player B. Additionally, since Player B’s rejection results
in both players finishing the game with their initial endowments, if she rejects a transfer
from Player A, Player B may consider herself as not a recipient of a benefit from Player A.
Thus, rejecting Player A’s transfer can exempt Player B from reciprocal concerns. In the
context of the modified trust game, the following general form for Player B’s utility may be
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appropriate:
uB(sB, sA; k, eB, ē) = πB(sA, sB)− θλA(eB, ē,∆B(sA, sB))λB(eB, πA(sA, sB)) (3.3)
where πi(sA, sB), i ∈ {A,B} denote material payoffs resulting from strategies sA and
sB , λA(.) indicates Player A’s perceived kindness towards Player B, λB(.) indicates Player
B’s kindness towards Player A, ∆B(sA, sB) is Player B’s interim material gain/loss result-
ing from strategies sA and sB in comparison to her initial endowment, θ ≥ 0 is a coefficient
reflecting sensitivity to reciprocity, eB is Player B’s second-order belief, ē is Player B’s ref-
erence payoff for which she considers payoff expectations higher than ē as ”greedy” and
hence unkind. This is a modified version of the utility proposed by Dufwenberg and Kirch-
steiger (2004), where second order belief and its fairness reference is added as an additional
factor alongside the material payoffs in the kindness functions. As a simple example, con-
sider the following kindness functions which produces the proposition below:
λA = (ē− eB)∆B(sA, sB) (3.4)
λB = (kb− eB)
Proposition 3.4. (Reciprocity). If Player B is reciprocal, she may decline a transfer from Player
A. More specifically, let ∆B(sA = Send, sB = Accept) = ∆B . If
(i) eB ≤ ē and θk ≥ 1(ē−eB)∆B , then Player B accepts Player A’s transfer and sends back b
∗ ∈
[0, 400];
(ii) eB ≤ ē and θk < 1(ē−eB)∆B and
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• θ > 1eB(ē−eB) , then Player B rejects Player A’s transfer;
• θ ≤ 1eB(ē−eB) , then Player B accepts Player A’s transfer and sends back b
∗ = 0;
(iii) eB > ē, then Player B accepts Player A’s transfer and sends back b∗ = 0.
The reason why Player B may reject a transfer is as follows. While she perceives Player
A to be kind ( eB ≤ ē), if her transfer rate is very low (e.g. k = 0), she would be unable to
return the kindness of Player A. Rejecting Player A’s transfer, however, absolves her from
the disutility from not reciprocating, since ∆(sA = Send, sB = Reject) = 0. Also note that
if eB > ē, Player B considers Player A as greedy, and hence, she is happy to act selfishly and
send back b = 0. Finally, since the utility of money is assumed to be linear in this example,
it is not possible to pin down how much Player B would choose to send back to Player A.
Moreover, due to the complexity of the form of the utility, substituting the linear utility of
money with a concave utility does not yield intuitive results.
3.3 Experiment
The experiment was conducted on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) in April 2017
with 317 MTurk workers located in the US, with HIT8 Approval Rate of at least %85 and
number of approved HITs greater than 100.9 No MTurk worker with the same worker ID
participated in the experiment more than once. The experiment program was written in
oTree (Chen, Schonger, and Wickens, 2016). Subjects were given a link on MTurk platform
to the website that hosted the experiment program, and were assigned to the roles of Player
8Human Intelligence Task
9Amazon Mechanical Turk is an online labor market that provides quick and inexpensive access to a large
and diverse subject pool. Horton, Rand, and Zeckhauser (2011) and Goodman, Cryder, and Cheema (2013) ar-
gue that there are many similarities between MTurk participants and traditional samples. However, Goodman,
Cryder, and Cheema (2013) also caution researchers to the potential reduction of statistical power, as MTurk
participants are found to be less likely to pay attention to experimental materials.
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A and Player B randomly. Players were matched ex-post. Informed consent was obtained
from all subjects.
Both players had the same initial token endowment (BA = BB = 100). Data was col-
lected using strategy method: subjects in the role Player A were asked whether they would
like to send their 100 tokens to Player B. They knew that k would be randomly drawn from{
0, 15 ,
1
3 , 1, 3
}
, but they made their decisions without knowing the actual transfer rate of
Player B. Data from subjects in the role Player B were collected using strategy method (Sel-




3 , 1, 3
}
, they were asked, if Player A sent them
tokens, whether they would accept a transfer from Player A; and if so, how many tokens
they would send back to Player A. They were allowed to choose integer amounts only for
their giving back decision. In the sending back decision screen, subjects in role B were
provided a calculator to aid them in their calculations. Additionally, subjects in the role
Player B were asked how many tokens they thought Person A expects to receive back from
them. Their answer to this question was not incentivized. Finally, subjects answered a
survey including questions about their age, gender and personality types according to the
Big Five Inventory (BFI) (Benet-Martinez and John, 1998; John, Donahue, and Kentle, 1991;
John, Naumann, and Soto, 2008).10 After all decisions were finished, a transfer rate k was
drawn randomly from the set of possible values and the subjects’ corresponding decisions
were implemented to determine the payoffs. The subjects were also paid a participation
fee of $0.25. Average earning was $1. The average completion time of the experiment was
10 minutes. Screenshots from the experiment program and a copy of the instructions are
provided in the Appendix.
10The survey also included five control questions meant to test subjects’ attention. 26 subjects who answered
control questions incorrectly are excluded from analysis.
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3.4 Hypotheses
Rejection of transfers and transfer rate (k)
R1-Selfish (R1-S). Player B never rejects a transfer from Player A.
R1-Other-regarding (R1-OR). Player B bases her rejection decision on her transfer rate, k.
Player B’s likelihood of rejecting a transfer from Player A decreases in k.
Rejection of transfers and second-order beliefs (eB)
R2-Inequity averse (R2-IA). Player B’s likelihood of rejecting a transfer from Player A is
independent of eB .
R2-Guilt averse (R2-GA). Player B’s likelihood of rejecting a transfer from Player A in-
creases in eb, and may depend on whether she can afford to transfer back eB to Player
A.
R2-Reciprocal (R2-R). Player B’s likelihood of rejecting a transfer from Player A has a non-
linear relationship with eB .
Giving back (b)
B-Selfish (B-S). Player B never gives back positive amounts.
B-Inequity averse (B-IA). If non-zero, the amount given back by Player B weakly decreases
in k, and is independent of second-order beliefs, eB .
B-Guilt averse (B-GA). The amount sent back by Player B weakly decreases in k, and weakly
increases in second-order beliefs, eB .
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B-Regner and Harth (B-RH). The amount sent back by Player B has an inverse U-shaped
relationship with second-order beliefs, eB .
3.5 Results
In this section, I analyze the data obtained from the experiment by testing each of the
hypotheses for Player B behavior stated in Section ??. I also provide a simple analysis of
Player A behavior.
I start with providing descriptive statistics of the subjects, obtained from their answers
in the post-experiment survey. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 provide information on subjects’ self-
reported age, gender, experience in economics experiments, self-assessed score on being
politically liberal, and calculated scores of Big Five personality traits (BFI; Benet-Martinez
and John (1998); John, Donahue, and Kentle (1991); John, Naumann, and Soto (2008)) based
on their answers to the 44-item BFI test. Overall, as noted by Goodman, Cryder, and
Cheema (2013) as well, the average subject appears to be less extroverted than the aver-
age person in a general population sample.
Table 3.1
Summary Statistics, Demographics








Standard deviations in parentheses.




Summary Statistics, Personality Traits
Player A Player B Pop. Sample∗
Extraversion 2.95 2.82 3.23
(0.86) (1.03) (0.90)
Agreeableness 3.84 3.97 3.84
(0.67) (0.71) (0.64)
Conscientiousness 3.99 3.98 3.74
(0.72) (0.75) (0.71)
Neuroticsm 2.59 2.56 3.13
(0.96) (1.02) (0.85)
Openness 3.61 3.52 3.87
(0.72) (0.71) (0.69)
Politically Liberal 3.13 3.13 –
(1.53) (1.47)
N 179 112 1406
Standard deviations in parentheses.
∗Comparison sample obtained from Srivastava, John, Gosling,
and Potter (2003) for age 38.
3.5.1 Player B: Rejection of Transfers
Selfish preferences predict Player B to always accept a transfer from Player A – hence
the predicted rejection rate is zero. In contrast, if Player B has other-regarding preferences,
she may reject a transfer from Player A. Moreover, her likelihood of rejecting is predicted
to decrease in her transfer rate, k (Hypothesis R1-OR). As Figure 3.2 shows, the data is
very much in support of the prediction of other-regarding preferences, both in terms of
the positive rejection rates and behavior with respect to the change in transfer rates. First,
about 46% of the subjects in role B choose to reject a transfer from Player A at least once,
as shown in Table 3.3. For each transfer rate, the fraction of subjects who have rejected a
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transfer from Player A is also presented in Table 3.4.11 Proportions tests for consequent
transfer rates indicate that the rejection rates for the lowest two transfer rates, k = 0 and
k = 1/5 are not significantly different from each other. However, the rejection rates for
k = 1/5 is higher than that for k = 1/3, and in return, rejection rates for k = 1/3 is higher
than that for k = 1. These findings provide support for the negative relationship between
rejection and Player B’s transfer rate.
Next question is whether Player B rejection is related to Player B’s second-order beliefs.
The distribution of second-order beliefs are presented in Figure 3.3. The average belief is
that subjects in role Player A expect to receive 88 tokens back. This number is significantly
less than the number of tokens A can send, 100, at the 5% confidence level (t-test, p=0.034).
However, the average non-zero belief of 91.6 tokens is not statistically different than 100
11A graph of subjects’ individual responses is provided in the Appendix.
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Fraction of subjects choosing reject
k = 0 k = 1/5 1/3 k = 1 k = 3
Fraction 0.39 0.31 0.16 0.04 0.04
(0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Proportions test∗ p = 0.10 p = 0.003 p = 0.001 p = 0.5
Standard errors in parentheses, N = 112.
∗H0 : Frackj = Frack(j+1) , where k1 = 0, k2 = 1/5, k3 = 1/3, k4 = 1, k5 = 3,
two-tailed test.
(t-test, p=0.096).
The overall Spearman correlation coefficient between rejection and second-order beliefs
is 0.13 (p=0.003), however, for different values of Player B’s transfer rate, this correlation
varies both in sign and significance (Table 3.5). Nevertheless, these findings indicate that
Player B rejection and Player B second-order beliefs are uncorrelated is incorrect. This rules
out Hypothesis R2-IA.
Table 3.5
Spearman correlation: Rejection and second-order beliefs
k = 0 k = 1/5 k = 1/3 k = 1 k = 3
ρ 0.21 0.23 0.26 -0.19 -0.12
p = 0.02 p = 0.013 p = 0.006 p = 0.04 p = 0.20
H0: Rejection and second-order belief is independent, N=112.
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Since the relationship between Player B rejection and second-order belief also depends
on Player B’s transfer rate, a more detailed analysis is required. Columns (1) and (2) of Table
3.6 present the results of regressions on the binary variable ”reject transfer” on Player B’s
transfer rate, Player B’s second-order belief and its square, a dummy variable (D) that takes
a value of 1 if it is not possible for Player B to transfer back her second-order belief to Player
A (second-order belief is infeasible, i.e. eB > 400k) and 0 otherwise, and demographic
variables and personality scores from the survey as controls. This yields the following
model:




Results indicate that, overall, subjects in role Player B take only their transfer rate and
whether they can fulfill their second-order beliefs into consideration when deciding whether
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to reject a transfer from Player A. The likelihood of rejection decreases in Player B’s trans-
fer rate and is higher when Player B is unable to transfer back her second-order belief to
Player A. These results are consistent with the predictions of guilt aversion model, stated
in Hypothesis R2-GA. Furthermore, likelihood ratio test for β2 = β3 = β5 = ... = β13 = 0
indicates that the coefficients of Player B’s second-order belief and its square and other
controls are jointly insignificant (chi2(11)=9.91, prob > 0.54). Finally, columns (3) and (4) of
Table 3.6 show the results of the regression conditional on Player B second-order beliefs be-
ing feasible (i.e. eB ≤ 400k). Not surprisingly, the significant negative relationship between
rejection and transfer rate is maintained.
3.5.2 Player B: Giving Back
How do the subjects behave once they accept? Figure 3.4 provides an overview of sub-
jects’ giving back behavior with respect to Player B’s transfer rate. The average amount
sent is significantly different from zero for k > 0 at 1% significance level.12 Since sub-
jects send back positive amounts significantly different from zero, selfish preferences can
be ruled out for explaining the overall data. Nevertheless, as presented in Figure C.3, there
are some subjects (n=13) who can be classified as selfish types: they accept a transfer from
Player A for all transfer rates and send back zero tokens (or an amount very close to zero)
to Player A. Additionally, Wilcoxon signed rank tests (Table 3.7) show that Player B’s giving
back in transfer rates for k = 1/5 and k = 1/3 are not significantly different from each other,
suggesting overall insensitivity to small differences in transfer rate.
12At k = 0, there are 17 subjects who send back non-zero amounts to Player A, and hence burn money.
The average non-zero amount sent back by these subjects is approximately 58 tokens, which is significantly
different than zero. It should be noted that, conditional on acceptance, the money burning behavior of these
subjects may be explained by a very high sensitivity to advantageous inequality (i.e. β > 1 in Fehr-Schmidt
utility). However, if the explanation is high sensitivity to advantageous inequality, these subjects should have
not chosen to accept a transfer from Player A in the previous stage. Thus, the behavior of these subjects cannot




(1) (2) (3) (4)
Transfer rate -1.07*** -0.49*** -0.46*** -0.46***

























Constant 0.40 3.48 -0.27 -3.71
(0.67) (33.17) (0.74) (7.48)
N 255 255 76 76
Log likelihood -113.79 -91.78 -41.66 -41.66
Data All All Belief≤ 400k Belief≤ 400k
Random effects probit regression with ”Reject” as dependent variable. All re-
gressions include subject fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Panels (a) and (b) in Figure 3.4 show that there is an inverse U-shaped relationship
between Player B giving and the transfer rate. However, as panel (c) shows, even with the
decline in Player B giving back from k = 1 to k = 3, actual transfers to Player A are higher
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on average when k = 3. In fact, the average amount of tokens received by Player A increases
in Player B’s transfer rate. This pattern is maintained when subjects in role Player B who
send everything back are excluded from the analysis (11 subjects, 18 observations). These
findings suggest that Player B giving back is price inelastic.
To further investigate the sensitivity of Player B giving back to the cost of giving back,
I use regression analysis. Table 3.8 presents the results of regressions with the amount of
tokens sent back by Player B as the dependent variable and Player B’s transfer rate, Player
B’s second-order belief and its square, a and demographic variables and personality scores
from the survey as explanatory variables. With this specification, the coefficient of Player
B’s transfer rate is not significantly different from zero, indicating insensitivity to cost of
giving back (column (1)). However, when the regression is repeated with an additional
independent variable indicating Player B’s inability to transfer her second-order belief to
Player A, D(eB > 400k), the coefficient of Player B’s transfer rate is found to be negative
and significant (column (2)). Furthermore, the coefficient of the dummy variable for the
condition eB > 400k is also significant and negative, indicating that subjects in role B take
both their transfer rates and their second-order beliefs into account when deciding how
much to send back. The negative relationship between Player B’s transfer rate and Player
B’s giving back is consistent with the predictions of guilt aversion model.
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Figure 3.4
















k=0 k=1/5 k=1/3 k=1 k=3
B transfer rate
















k=0 k=1/5 k=1/3 k=1 k=3
B transfer rate
























k=0 k=1/5 k=1/3 k=1 k=3
B transfer rate
(c) Average Amount Received by Player A
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Table 3.7
Player B Giving Back
k = 0 k = 1/5 k = 1/3 k = 1 k = 3
(i) Mean(Sent) 14.56 105.69 127.05 149.07 107.75
(6.49) (12.95) (11.90) (9.35) (8.99)
N 68 77 94 108 108
Wilcoxon signed z = −5.46 z = −0.75 z = −0.60 z = 5.19
rank test∗ p = 0.000 p = 0.46 p = 0.55 p = 0.000
(ii) Mean(Sent¿0) 58.24 127.16 143.89 164.29 117.55
(23.38) (14.14) (12.34) (8.97) (9.19)
N 17 64 83 98 99
Wilcoxon signed z = −0.80 z = −0.58 z = −0.34 z = 5.17
rank test∗ p = 0.42 p = 0.56 p = 0.73 p = 0.000
(iii) Mean(Transfer)† 0 21.14 42.35 149.07 323.25
(0) (2.59) (3.96) (9.35) (26.96)
N 68 77 94 108 108
Wilcoxon signed z = −7.42 z = −5.62 z = −7.91 z = −7.69
rank test∗ p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗H0 : Transferkj = Transferk(j+1) , where k1 = 0, k2 = 1/5, k3 = 1/3, k4 = 1, k5 = 3.
† Transfer = k ×Amount Sent Back
Additionally, in column (3) of Table 3.8, the regression on Player B’s giving back decision
is repeated with a sub-sample where subjects in Role B are able to transfer their second
order beliefs to Player A. Here, the coefficients of second-order belief and its square are
significantly different from zero. Moreover their opposing signs, with the coefficient of the
second-order belief itself being positive indicate that Player B giving back and second-order
beliefs have an inverse U-shaped relationship in this sub-sample. This finding supports
Regner and Harth (2014)’s claims, as provided in hypothesis Hypothesis B-RH.
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Table 3.8
Determinants of Giving Back
(1) (2) (3)
Transfer rate 6.63* -11.83*** -11.82***
(3.82) (4.00) (3.19)
Belief 2.33 2.79* 3.74***
(1.56) (1.43) (1.34)
Belief2 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
D(eB > 400k) -109.76***
(12.10)
Age 6.02 5.86 6.45
(6.54) (5.98) (4.80)
Female -326.53 -294.13 -274.42
(351.21) (321.19) (254.52)
Experience -44.74 -80.67 -93.57
(206.78) (189.22) (153.27)
Extraversion -216.71*** -214.26*** -173.46***
(69.99) (64.06) (51.84)
Agreeable. 4.79 -0.63 -9.10
(120.96) (110.64) (88.79)
Conscientious. 400.74 387.56* 301.57
(253.12) (231.54) (184.52)
Neuroticism 66.44 61.39 30.35
(73.05) (66.82) (53.65)
Openness -39.26 -49.28 -29.10
(60.18) (55.31) (44.61)
Liberal 95.00 90.95* 68.61
(59.04) (54.01) (43.46)
Constant -1614.29 -1480.20 -1177.58
(1961.93) (1794.43) (1422.89)
Observations 450 450 332
Log likelihood -2039.82 -1999.91 -1587.78
Data All All Belief≤ 400k
Random effects tobit regression with ”Amount sent back” as dependent variable, bounded
below at 0 and above at 400. All regressions include subject fixed effects. Standard errors
in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
3.5.3 Player A: Sending to Player B
In this section, I analyze the decisions of subjects in role Player A to send their endow-
ments to Player B. This analysis is largely exploratory as data collected from subjects in
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Player A role is limited.
First, 73% of subjects have chosen to send their endowments to Player B, which is sig-
nificantly different than 0%. The high proportion of subjects who have decided to send
is surprising, given that subjects in role Player A do not know the exact value of Player
B’s transfer rate at the time they are making this decision. Regression results reported on
column (1) of Table 3.10 suggest that the likelihood of subjects in role A of sending their
endowment is positively correlated with the Big Five Inventory personality trait ”agreeable-
ness.” This positive correlation is not surprising, however, since agreeableness is defined
to be correlated with qualities such as trust and altruism (John, Naumann, and Soto, 2008).
Additionally, likelihood ratio test does not reject joint insignificance of variables excluding
agreeableness (chi2(8) = 9.06, prob > chi2 = 0.3376).
Table 3.9
Fraction of A subjects Choosing Send Endowment
k = 0 k = 1/5 k = 1/3 k = 1 k = 3
Fraction 0.12 0.29 0.38 0.71 0.82
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Proportions test z = −3.31 z = −1.41 z = −4.97 z = −1.90
p = 0.001 p = 0.16 p = 0.000 p = 0.06
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗H0 : Transferkj = Transferk(j+1) , where k1 = 0, k2 = 1/5, k3 = 1/3, k4 = 1,
k5 = 3.
Since in the mini trust games studied so far in the literature, both players have binary
choices, a comparison of Player A’s sending decision in my game with the findings in the
existing literature may be misleading. This is because, in the binary trust games, payoff
expectations of subjects in role A can be summarized by one parameter: the probability
that Player B chooses the action that yields Player A the higher payoff. In contrast, in my
version of the trust game, Player A’s payoff expectations depend on his beliefs over Player
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B’s strategy, which may depend on Player B’s transfer rate. However, in my modified trust
game, Player B has a richer action space, and her strategy has been shown, both theoretically
and empirically, to depend on Player B’s transfer rate.
In order to gain further understanding of the factors driving the trusting behavior of
subjects in role Player A, I held an additional treatment where subjects in role A are able to
condition their answers on Player B’s transfer rate. In this treatment, subjects in role A are
asked to choose between sending and keeping their endowments conditional on the value
of Player B’s transfer rate. Table 3.9 reports the proportion of subjects in role A who have
chosen to send their endowment for each value of Player B’s transfer rate. Results of propor-
tions tests suggest that the fraction of subjects in role A who send their endowments weakly
increases in Player B’s transfer rate. Moreover, regression results in column (2) of Table 3.10
support the positive relationship between Player B’s transfer rate and the likelihood of the
choice ”send endowment.” Furthermore, likelihood ratio test results indicate that variables
excluding transfer rate are jointly insignificant (chi2(9) = 9.06, Prob > chi2 = 0.4314).
3.6 Conclusion
In this study, I investigate a decision maker’s motives for declining a positive transfer
from another player in a one-shot interaction, and focus on the behavioral biases of guilt
aversion, reciprocity and inequity aversion as possible drivers of behavior. In order to for-
malize and refine the predictions of these behavioral biases, I modify the widely used trust
game by allowing the second mover to decline a transfer from the first mover and by vary-
ing the second mover’s cost of reciprocation. In contrast to the impunity game where rejec-
tion results in money burning, in my game, second mover’s rejection results in the amount
declined to be returned to the first mover. The cost of reciprocation is varied by changing
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Treatment Incomplete Info Complete Info
Incomplete Info: Probit regression with ”Send=1” as dependent variable. Com-
plete Info: Random effects probit regression with subject fixed effects and
”Send=1” as dependent variable. Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
how much of a unit of money second mover sends to the first mover reaches the first mover.
These modifications allow me to derive distinct testable predictions for the behavioral bi-
ases considered over second mover’s rejection and giving decisions.
In an experiment conducted on Amazon Mechanical Turk, I vary the cost of reciproca-
tion for the second mover, and test the predictions of each model. My results support the
presence of guilt aversion and reciprocity. First, a significant proportion of subjects (46%)
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rejects at least once a transfer that is materially beneficial to them. Second, the likelihood
of rejection increases in second mover’s cost of reciprocation and is higher if the second
mover cannot transfer back to the first mover her belief about first mover’s payoff expec-
tation. Third, second mover’s giving increases in her cost of reciprocation, but the actual
transfers to first mover decreases in the cost of reciprocation. This suggests that price elas-
ticity of second mover giving back is low. Finally, a large proportion of first movers chooses
to send their endowments, despite not knowing the exact value of second mover’s cost of
reciprocation. In a treatment where the first movers can condition their decision on the
second mover’s cost of reciprocation, first movers’ likelihood of sending a positive amount
decreases in second mover’s cost of reciprocation. This last finding is suggestive for first
movers’ correct anticipation of second mover’s behavior, however due to the limitations of
the current design, the answer to this last question is left for future research.
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Appendix A: Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Non-Binding Promises and Inequity Aversion
Payoffs of candidate and voter in transfer and voting stages are given below. For sim-
plicity I assume αC = αV = α.
Post-voting stage: Candidate chooses transfer t to maximize
UC(t|CP, vote) = B +W − t− αmax {B + t− d− (B +W − t), 0}
− βc max {B +W − t− (B + t− d), 0} (A.1)
= B +W − t− αmax {2t−W − d, 0} − βc max {W + d− 2t, 0}
Voting stage: Voter chooses between ”vote” and ”do not vote”, conditional on her choice
at the offer stage.
• If the voter has accepted up-front payment, x,
Uv(vote|UFP, x) = B + x− d
− p′ [αmax {W + d− 2x, 0}+ βV max {2x−W − d, 0}]
− (1− p′) [αmax {d− 2x, 0}+ βV max {2x− d, 0}] (A.2)
Uv(DNV|UFP, x) = B + x− p [αmax {W − 2x, 0}+ βV max {2x−W, 0}]
− (1− p) [αmax {−2x, 0}+ βV max {2x, 0}] (A.3)
• If the voter has accepted conditional payment, and believes that the transfer will
be t∗,
Uv(vote|CP, t∗) = B + p′t∗ − d
− p′ [αmax {W + d− 2t∗, 0}+ βV max {2t∗ −W − d, 0}]
− (1− p′) [αmax {d, 0}+ βV max {−d, 0}] (A.4)
Uv(DNV|CP, t∗) = B + p′t∗ − p [αmax {W − 2t∗, 0}+ βV max {2t∗ −W, 0}]
− (1− p) [αmax {0, 0}+ βV max {0, 0}]
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• If the voter does not accept any payment,
Uv(vote|DNA) = B − d− p′ [αmax {W + d, 0}+ βV max {−W − d, 0}]
− (1− p′) [αmax {d, 0}+ βV max {−d, 0}] (A.5)
Uv(DNV|DNA) = B − p [αmax {W, 0}+ βV max {−W, 0}]
− (1− p) [αmax {0, 0}+ βV max {0, 0}] (A.6)
In the proofs of Propositions 1.2 and 1.3, I show that there are up-front and conditional
payments, x and t∗, for which the utility of voting to utility from not voting difference is
positive. However, if the voter does not accept any payment, the utility difference is always
negative, implying that the voter never votes if she does not accept any payment:
∆DNAV = Uv(vote|DNA)− Uv(DNV|DNA) = −d− (p′ − p)αW < 0 (A.7)
Proof of Proposition 1.2
Proposition 1.2: If the candidate’s sensitivity to advantageous inequity is sufficiently
low (βC < 0.5), then vote buying only occurs with up-front payment.
Proof. Suppose the voter is inequity averse (0 < βV < 1) and has utility function (1.1);
the candidate is either selfish (βC = 0) or also inequity averse, but has low sensitivity to
advantageous inequity (0 < βC < 0.5). I first show that there exists an equilibrium in
which vote buying occurs and the candidate offers only up-front payment; I then show, by
contradiction, that vote buying cannot occur if the candidate offers conditional payment.
First, assume that there exists an equilibrium in which the candidate buys vote with
up-front payment, i.e. the candidate offers positive up-front payment, the voter accepts
the up-front payment and votes for the candidate. Since it is a one-shot game, I proceed
with backward induction. Note that, because the voter accepts up-front payment in this
equilibrium, the game ends after the voting stage.
At the voting stage, the following inequality should hold for the voter who has accepted
up-front payment:
[UV (vote|UFP)− UV (DNV|UFP)] = ∆UFPV ≥ 0
∆UFPV =

2(1− p)(α+ βV )x− (1 + α)d− (p′ − p)αW if x ≤ d2
2(p′ − p)(α+ βV )x− (1 + p′(α+ βV )− βV )d− (p′ − p)αW if d2 ≤ x ≤
W
2
2p′(α+ βV )x− (1 + p′(α+ βV )− βV )d− (p′α+ pβV )W if W2 ≤ x ≤
W+d
2
(p′ − p)βVW − (1− βV )d if x ≥ W+d2
(A.8)
Let x ≤ d2 be case(i),
d




2 ≤ x ≤
W+d




case (iv). Note that when x = d2 , ∆
UFP
V < 0. Hence the UFP offer should be strictly greater
than d2 to provide incentive to vote. This allows us to ignore case (i).
From (A.8), we can find the minimum accepted UFP the voter requires to vote. For case
(ii) this is
x ≥ [1− βV + p
′(α+ βV )] d+ (p
′ − p)αW
2(p′ − p)(α+ βV )
= x2 (A.9)
while for case (iii),
x ≥ [1− βV + p









At the offer choice stage the following inequalities should hold for the voter:
[UV (UFP, vote|x)− UV (CP, DNV|y = 0)]x=x ≥ 0 (A.12)
[UV (UFP, vote|x)− UV (DNA, DNV)]x=x ≥ 0
Recall that




Note also that UV (CP, DNV|y = 0) = UV (DNA, DNV) = B − pαW . Hence both dif-
ferences in (A.12) are equal. As a result the utility difference between different offers (UFP
and CP, UFP and DNA) for the voter, given UFP x, is
∆offer, UFPV = (1 + 2p




d(1− βV + p′(α+ βV ) + (p′ − p)αWd )×[
1− 2βV + 2p(α+ βV )
2(p′ − p)(α+ βV )
]
if x = x2











if x = x3
d
[




if x = x4
(A.15)
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Sufficient conditions for this utility difference to be positive for each case is given below:
∆offer, UFPV

≥ 0 if βV ≤ 12 and 1 ≥ 2(p
′ − p)(α+ βV ) and p′ 6= p for x = x2
≥ 0 if βV ≤ 12 and p
′ 6= 0 for x = x3
> 0 if βV < 12 and p
′βV ≥ pα for x = x4
(A.16)
Since these conditions do not contradict with the underlying assumptions, there exists
parameters for which the voter accepts UFP.
At the offer making stage the following inequality should hold for the candidate type
j where j=Selfish, Fair:
[UC,j((x = x, y = 0)|UFP, vote)− UC,j((.)|DNA, DNV)] = ∆Offer, UFPC,j ≥ 0 (A.17)
Case 1: If the candidate is selfish, then ∆Offer, UFPC,S = (p′ − p)W − xj , j ∈ {2, 3, 4}. For
different cases, this difference equals to:
• If x = x2,
∆Offer, UFPC,S = (p
′ − p)W − [1− βV + p
′(α+ βV )] d+ (p
′ − p)αW







W − (1 + (α+ βV )p
′ − βV )
2(p− p′)(α+ βV )
d ≷ 0
• If x = x3,
∆Offer, UFPC,S = (p
′ − p)W − [1− βV + p





p′α(2(p′ − p)− 1) + 2p′2βV − pβV (2p′ + 1)
2p′(α+ βV )
W




• If x = x4,
∆Offer, UFPC,S = (p




(2(p′ − p)− 1)Wd − 1
2
d ≷ 0
Thus, if the candidate is selfish, the voter is inequity averse, and these are common
knowledge, then there exists combinations of parameters for which ∆Offer, UFPC,S ≥ 0 for the
three cases above.
Case 2: If the candidate is inequity averse, then UC,F ((.)|DNA, DNV) = B + p(1 −
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βC)W , and




Thus the utility difference of the inequity averse candidate, ∆Offer, UFPC,F , is equal to
∆Offer, UFPC,F = (p− p









′α + pβC − α)W . Thus if (p′α +
pβC−α) < 0, then ∆Offer, UFPC,F ≤ ∆
Offer, UFP
C,S , i.e. if an inequity averse candidate finds it worth-
while to offer positive payment, a selfish candidate does too. If (p′α + pβC − α) ≥ 0, then
the behavior of the selfish candidate becomes indicative of the inequity averse candidate,
In other words, for any x, we can find a subset of parameters for which ∆OfferC,F > 0. This
concludes the first part of the proof that there exists an equilibrium in which vote buying
occurs and the candidate offers only UFP.
Next, I show that vote buying cannot occur if the candidate is sufficiently selfish (0 ≤
βC < 0.5). In this case, the transfer that maximizes the utility function given in (A.1) for
βC < 0.5 is zero (t∗ = 0). Hence the candidate will never transfer a positive amount to the
voter, regardless of his promises at the offer stage. Since the voter is aware of this fact, any
conditional payment offer is cheap talk. Thus, by backward induction, at the voting stage
the voter will not vote even if she accepts conditional payment, and at the offer stage she will
not accept any conditional payment offer regardless of its size. As a result, an equilibrium
where vote buying occurs via conditional payment cannot exist. 
Proof of Proposition 1.3
Proposition 1.3: If the candidate’s sensitivity to advantageous inequity is sufficiently
high (βC ≥ 0.5), then vote buying only occurs with conditional payment.
Proof. Suppose the voter is inequity averse (0 < βV < 1) and has utility function (1.1);
the candidate is inequity averse and 0.5 ≤ βC < 1. I first show that it is feasible for the
candidate to buy vote with conditional payment; I then show that it is also feasible for the
candidate to buy vote with up-front payment; and finally I show that the candidate weakly
prefers buying vote with conditional payment than with up-front payment. I prove these
results first by assuming βC = 0.5, and then by assuming 0.5 < βC < 1.
Case 1: βC = 0.5
First, assume that it is feasible for the candidate to buy vote with conditional payment,
i.e. the candidate offers positive conditional payment, the voter accepts the conditional
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payment and votes for the candidate. Since the game is one-shot, I proceed with backward
induction.
At the transfer stage the candidate maximizes (A.1) by choosing t∗ ∈ [0, W+d2 ].




(1 + 2α)(p− p′)t∗ − (1 + α)d+ (p′ − p)αW if t∗ ≤ W2
[p′ − p+ 2(p′α+ pβV )]t∗ − (1 + α)d+ (p′α+ pβV )W if W2 ≤ t
∗ ≤ W+d2
(1− 2βV )(p′ − p)t∗ − (1 + α− p′(α+ βV ))d+ (p′ − p)βVW if t∗ ≥ W+d2
(A.23)
Let t∗ ≤ W2 ve case (i),
W
2 ≤ t
∗ ≤ W+d2 be case (ii) and t
∗ ≥ W+d2 be case (iii). From
(A.23), we can find the minimum accepted CP the voter requires to vote. For case (i) this is
t∗ ≥ (1 + α)d+ (p
′ − p)αW
(1 + 2α)(p′ − p)
= t1 (A.24)
while for case (ii)
t∗ ≥ (1 + α)d+ (p
′α+ pβV )W
p′ − p+ 2(p′α+ pβV )
= t2 (A.25)




, we may check directly whether ∆CPV is positive at the







= (1− 2βV )(p′ − p)
W + d
2
− (1 + α− p′(α+ βV ))d













Thus if (p′−p)Wd −1−(1−p
′)(1+2α)−p(1−2βV ) ≥ 0, t3 = W+d2 . At the offer choice stage
the following inequalities should hold for the voter (assuming the offer (x = 0, y = tj)):
[UV (CP, vote)− UV (UFP, DNV)] ≥ 0 (ov.i) (A.28)
[UV (CP, vote)− UV (DNA, DNV)] ≥ 0 (ov.ii)
Recall that UV (DNA, DNV) = UV (UFP, DNV;x = 0) = B − pαW and




The utility difference between different choices (CP vs. UFP; CP vs. DNA) for the voter
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is
∆offer, CPV = p
′(1 + 2α)t− (1 + α)d− (p′ − p)αW if t ≤ W + d
2
(A.30)
For each case, we can find combinations of parameters for which ∆offer, CPV ≥ 0.
Finally at the offer making stage the following inequality should hold for the candidate:
[UC((x = 0, y = tj)|CP, vote)− UC((.)|DNA, DNV)] = U
offer, CP
C ≥ 0 (A.31)
Recall that UC((.)|DNA, DNV)) = B + p(1− βC)W and





∆offer, CPC = (p− p









− 1] ≷ 0
This shows that making a positive payment promise is rational for the candidate only
if (p− p′)Wd − 1 ≥ 0, which is satisfied by a subset of parameters.
Finally we should check if it is feasible for the candidate to buy vote with up-front pay-
ment and if so, if vote buying with up-front payment yields higher utility than buying vote
with conditional payment for the candidate. Note that the minimum up-front payment
required to vote are the same as the case where βC < 0.5: x ∈ {x2, x3, x4}. Assume the
candidate offers (x > 0, y = 0).
At the offer selection stage the sufficient conditions for the voter to choose UFP and then
vote (∆offer, UFPV ≥ 0) is
∆offer, UFPV =

≥ 0 if p′ 6= p and 1 ≥ 2(p′ − p)(α+ 12) for x = x2
> 0 if p′, p 6= 0 for x = x3
> 0 if p
′
2 ≥ pα for x = x4
(A.34)
At the offer making stage the candidate’s utility is
UC((x, 0)|UFP, vote) = B + p′(1− βC)W + (α− p′(α+ βC))d




which is positive for a subset of parameters.
We can now compare the utilities of buying vote with up-front and conditional pay-
ments. Let ∆UFP-CPC be the candidate’s utiilty difference when he buys vote with up-front
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payment and when he buys vote with conditional payment.
∆UFP-CPC = UC((x, 0)|UFP, vote)− UC((0, t)|CP, vote) (A.36)
Since both x and t are less than or equal to W+d2 ,
∆UFP-CPC = p
′(1− 2βC)t− (1 + 2α− 2p′(α+ βC))x + (α+ βC)(1− p′)d (A.37)
βC=0.5= −
[













= [p′(1 + 2α)− (1− 2α)]x + (1 + 2α)(1− p′)d
2
= (p′ − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0









This shows that the candidate weakly prefers buying vote with conditional payment
over up-front payment if βC = 0.5. Moreover this preference is strict when p′ < 1.
Case 2: 0.5 < βC < 1
Again, assume that it is feasible for the candidate to buy vote with conditional payment,
i.e. the candidate offers positive conditional payment, the voter accepts the conditional
payment and votes for the candidate. Since the game is one-shot, I proceed with backward
induction.
At the transfer stage the candidate choses t∗ = W+d2 .
At the voting stage [UV (vote|CP)− UV (DNV|CP)]t∗=W+d
2
= ∆CPv ≥ 0 should hold:




⇒ ∆CPV = (1− 2βV )(p′ − p)
W + d
2







− 1− (1− p′)(1 + 2α)− p(1− 2βV )
]
R 0
If (p′ − p)Wd − 1− (1− p
′)(1 + 2α)− p(1− 2βV ) ≥ 0, voter choses to vote.
At the offer selection stage assume the offer is (x = 0, y = t∗ = W+d2 ). Then the
following inequality should hold:
UV (CP, vote|t∗)− UV (UFP, DNV)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=UV (DNA, DNV)
= ∆offer, CPV ≥ 0 (A.39)
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Recall that
UV (CP, vote|t∗) = B + p′(1 + 2α)t∗ − (1 + α)d− p′αW (A.40)
UV (DNA, DNV) = B− pαW
Then














− 1− (1− p′)(1 + 2α)
]
≷ 0
Again, there are combinations of parameters for which ∆offer, CPV ≥ 0.
At the offer making stage, the following inequality should hold for the candidate:
[ UC((x = 0, y = t
∗)|CP, vote)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=B+p′(1−βC)W−p′(1−2βC)t∗−βCd
−UC((.)|DNA, DNV)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=B+p(1−βC)W



















W − [p′(1− 2βC) + βC ]d ≷ 0
As in cases above, there are combinations of parameters for which ∆offer, CPC ≥ 0.
Finally we should check if it is feasible for the candidate to buy vote with up-front pay-
ment and if so, if vote buying with up-front payment yields higher utility than buying vote
with conditional payment for the candidate. Note that the minimum up-front payment
required to vote are the same as the case where βC < 0.5: x ∈ {x2, x3, x4}. Assume the
candidate offers (x > 0, y = 0).
At the voting stage: The voter votes only if the up-front payment is higher than the
corresponding minimum accepted payment x ∈ {x2, x3, x4} as before.
At the offer selection stage, sufficient conditions for the voter to select UFP over DNA
are
• For x = x2, 1− 2βC + 2p(α+ βV ) ≥ 0, 1− 2(p′ − p)(α+ βV ) ≥ 0, and p′ 6= p.
• For x = x3, there are no sufficient conditions. Necessary condition:
∆offer, UFPV =
[
(1 + 2p′(α+ βV )− 2βV )(p′α+ pβV )
2p′(α+ βV )
− (p′ − p)α
]
W
+ (1 + p′(α+ βV )− βV )
[






• For x = x4, p′βV − pα ≤ 0
At the offer making stage there exists combination of parameters at which ∆offer, UFPC ≥ 0.
Hence it is feasible for the candidate to buy vote with up-front payment.
Finally, comparison of utilities (UFP-CP):
To show that the candidate prefers to buy vote with CP, I first show that maxUC(UFP,vote) ≤
maxUC(CP,vote). Combining this with t∗ = arg maxUC(t|CP, vote), I reach the conclusion
that the candidate’s optimal payment method is CP.
Candidate’s utility from buying the vote with UFP is
UC(x|UFP, vote) =B + p′W − x− p′ [αmax {2x−W − d, 0}+ βC max {W + d− 2x, 0}]

















−(1 + 2α) < 0 if x ≥ W+d2
(A.45)
Thus, depending on p′, UC(x|UFP, vote) is maximized either at x = d2 or x =
W+d
2 . In
contrast, candidate’s utility from buying the vote with CP,
UC(t|CP, vote) =B + p′W − p′t− p′ [αmax {2t−W − d, 0}+ βC max {W + d− 2t, 0}]
− (1− p′) [αmax {−d, 0}+ βC max {d, 0}] (A.46)



























Now suppose p′ is such that arg maxUC(x|UFP, vote) = d2 . Then candidate’s maximum
utility from UFP is always less than his maximum utility from CP, i.e. maxUc(UFP, vote)−
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maxUc(CP, vote) is equal to


































Note that A is maximized at 0 when p′ = 1. Thus maxUc(UFP, vote) < maxUc(CP, vote).
Similarly, suppose p′ is such that arg maxUC(x|UFP, vote) = W+d2 . Then candidate’s
maximum utility from UFP is always less than his maximum utility from CP is equal to
maxUc(UFP, vote)−maxUc(CP, vote) =





+ ((1− p′)α− p′βC)d
−
[





























Thus Uc(x|UFP, vote) ≤ maxUc(UFP, vote) ≤ maxUc(CP, vote) = Uc(t = t∗|CP, vote).
This implies that whenever vote buying is rational for the candidate, the candidate is better
off using conditional payment rather than up-front payment. 
A.2 Non-Binding Promises and Guilt Aversion
Proof of Proposition 1.4
Proposition 1.4. Suppose both the candidate and the voter are guilt averse. If the voter’s
cost of not keeping her promise is greater than the cost of voting, then vote buying occurs
with either up-front or conditional payment; if voter’s cost of not keeping her promise is
less than the cost of voting, then vote buying occurs only with conditional payment.
Proof. Suppose the candidate receives disutility from not keeping his promises. Then at the
transfer stage the candidate’s utility function is
UC(t|y) = B +W − t− ΦCCC(y, t) (A.50)
where y denotes the candidate’s promise, t denotes the actual transfer to the voter, ΦC
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y if y > 0 and y > t
0 otherwise
(A.51)










> 0. Note also that ∂CC∂t =
−y−ty < 0 if y > t, and
∂2CC
∂t2
= 1y > 0,

















Suppose that the voter receives disutility from not keeping her promise as well and let









At the voting stage the behavior of the voter depends on what she previously chose at
the offer selection stage.
• A voter who has chosen do not accept (DNA) never votes since
UV (vote|DNA) = B − d (A.54)
UV (DNV|DNA) = B
• Up-front payment (UFP). The voter’s utilities from voting and not voting are
UV (vote|UFP) = B + x− d (A.55)
UV (DNV|UFP) = B + x− ΦV CV (p, p′)
The voter will vote if p′ > p and ∆UFPV = ΦV
(p′−p)2
2 − d > 0.
• Conditional payment (CP). The voter’s utilities from voting and not voting are
UV (vote|CP) = B + p′t∗ − d (A.56)
UV (DNV|CP) = B + pt∗ − ΦV CV (p, p′)
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− d > 0 (A.57)
Note that if it is rational to vote for the voter who has chosen UFP, then it is also rational
to vote for the voter who has chosen CP since ∆UFPV > 0⇒ ∆CPV > 0.
At the offer selection stage there are three possible cases on how the cost of voting and
cost of lying are related (assuming p′ > p):
Case 1. d < ΦV (p
′−p)2
2 : In this case voter’s guilt is larger than the cost of voting. Thus the
voter votes in the following stage regardless of whether she chooses UFP or CP. When
deciding on whether to accept any payment, she compares the following utilities:
UV (UFP, vote|x) = B + x− d





y − d (A.58)
UV (DNA, DNV) = B






y − d, 0
}
Case 2. ΦV (p
′−p)2










: In this case the voter’s guilt is
smaller than the cost of voting but her promised payment motivates her to vote in the
voting stage if she accepts CP. When deciding to accept any payment she compares
the utilities
UV (UFP, DNV|x) = B + x− ΦV
(p′ − p)2
2





y − d (A.59)
UV (DNA, DNV) = B









y − d, 0
}









< d: In this case the voter never votes regardless
of what payment she chooses. When deciding on whether to accept any payment she
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compares the utilities
UV (UFP, DNV|x) = B + x− ΦV
(p′ − p)2
2









UV (DNA, DNV) = B














At the offer making stage, the candidate’s problem can be divided into two cases.
Case 1. d < ΦV (p
′−p)2
2 : Since the voter votes regardless of whether she chooses UFP or CP,
the relevant utilities for the candidate are
UC(x|UFP, vote) = B + p′W − x s. to x ≥ d
















UC((.)|DNA, DNV) = B + pW






x∗ = y∗ = 0.
Case 2. ΦV (p
′−p)2
2 < d: Since the voter does not vote if she accepts UFP, the candidate
chooses x∗ = 0. For the optimal CP offer the candidate solves
max
y
















































A.3 Non-Binding Promises and Reciprocity
Proof of Proposition 1.5
Proposition 1.5. If the candidate is selfish and the voter is reciprocal, vote buying occurs
only with up-front payment.
Proof. Suppose the candidate cares only about his own material payoff, but the voter is
reciprocal. Let the utility function of the voter have the form
UV (πv, πc) = πv + θkcπc (A.64)
where πv, πc denote the material payoffs of the voter and candidate, respectively, θ > 0 de-
notes voter’s sensitivity towards candidate’s payoff, and kc is candidate’s kindness towards
the voter. Assume that the voter perceives up-front payment offers greater than the cost of
voting as ”kind”. Then candidate’s kindness towards the voter is
kc(x) = Ix>dx (A.65)
where x denotes the up-front payment offer, Ix>d is an indicator variable that takes on the
value 1 if x > d and 0 otherwise.
At the voting stage, a voter who has accepted up-front payment, x, compares the fol-
lowing utilities:
UV (vote|x,UFP) = BV + x− d+ θIx>dx
[
B + p′W − x
]
(A.66)
UV (DNV|x,UFP) = BV + x+ θIx>dx [B + pW − x]
For the voter to vote, the following inequality should hold:




W − d ≥ 0 (A.67)





At the offer selection stage, the voter accepts any positive up-front payment offers.
Note that since the voter knows that the candidate is self-interested, voter never accepts
conditional payments.
At the offer making stage, candidate compares the following utilities:
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UC(.|DNA) = BC + pW (A.69)
UC(x|UFP, vote) = BC + p′W − x∗
where x∗ = max {x, d+ ε} and ε ≥ 0 is a small number. Thus if






then the candidate offers (mUFP,mCP) = (x∗, 0) in equilibrium. 
A.4 Screenshots from experiment program and instructions
Figure A.1
Candidate screen at the offer stage
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Figure A.2
Voter screen at the offer stage
Figure A.3
Voter screen at the voting stage
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Figure A.4





Welcome and thank you for coming today to participate in this experiment. This is an experiment in 
decision-making. If you follow the instructions and make good decisions, you can earn a significant 
amount of money, which will be paid to you at the end of the session. The currency in this experiment is 
called tokens (10 tokens = $1). The experiment consists of 20 identical decision rounds.  
During the experiment it is important that you do not talk to any other subjects. Please either turn off 
your cell phones or put them on silent. If you have a question, please raise your hand, and an 
experimenter will answer your question. Failure to comply with these instructions means that you will be 




At the beginning of the experiment you will be randomly assigned a role. The two possible roles you can 
be assigned are `Voter’ and `Candidate’. There will be an equal number of voters and candidates. Your 
roles will stay fixed for all 20 rounds until the end of the experiment. That is, if at the beginning of the 
experiment you were assigned the role of a candidate (voter), you will keep this role for the entire 
experiment.  
At the beginning of each round, all participants will be randomly paired, with each pair consisting of one 
voter and one candidate. Since you are most likely to be matched with a different participant in each 
round, it will be impossible to track your counterpart between rounds. No participant will ever be 
informed about the identities of the participants they are paired with, neither during nor after the 
experiment. 
 
In this experiment, at each round, both the voter and the candidate are assigned 20 tokens. Each round, 
the candidate has the chance to win 50 additional tokens. Whether the candidate wins the additional 
tokens is determined randomly by the computer in the following way: The candidate wins the election 
(and hence the additional 50 tokens) if the computer draws a WHITE ball from an urn that contains RED 
and WHITE balls. The total number of balls contained in the urn is fixed at 100, but the number of white 
balls in the urn will change from one round to another.   
The voter may increase the number of white balls (by exchanging them with red balls) in the urn by 
voting for the candidate. However, this costs 10 tokens to the voter.  
Payment Types 
A payment is what a candidate can offer the voter in exchange for their vote. The payment is in terms of 
tokens and it can take two possible forms, “Up-front Payment” and “Conditional Payment”. 
 An up-front payment, if accepted by the voter, is paid to the voter prior to the election.  
 A conditional payment, if accepted by the voter, is paid to the voter if the candidate wins (i.e. 
payment is conditioned on the candidate winning the election) and hence paid after the election. 
 
Development of each round  
Each of the 20 rounds consists of an independent election process of 5 steps, which are described below. 
Step 1: Information Dissemination. Both the candidate (C) and the voter (V) are informed about  
 Number of white balls in the urn 
 Number of white balls in the urn if the voter votes for the candidate 
Step 2: Candidate Offer. In each group, the candidate decides on the number of tokens he/she offers for 
each type of payment. The offer cannot be greater than what the candidate owns at the time of payment. 
(Note that this implies that an up-front payment cannot be greater than 20 tokens, and a conditional 
payment cannot be greater than 70 tokens.) 
Step 3: Voter Decision. Once the candidate submits his/her offers, the voter is informed about these 
offers. The voter is then asked to choose among the following options: (a) Accept Up-front Payment in 
exchange for Vote, (b) Accept Conditional Payment in exchange for Vote, (c) Do not accept payment. If 
the voter has accepted Up-front Payment in Step 3, the up-front payment is transferred to the voter’s 
account. 
Step 4: Election. The voter decides whether to vote for the candidate or not. If the voter decides to vote, 
10 tokens are deducted from his/her account. The number of white balls in the urn is adjusted 
corresponding to the voter’s choice over voting. The computer draws a ball from the urn, and announces 
its color. Both the candidate and the voter are informed about the result of the election. 
(If applicable) Step 5: Post-election transfer. If the voter has accepted Conditional Payment prior to the 
election and the candidate has won the election, the candidate decides on the number of tokens he/she 
transfers to the voter.  
At the end of each round, each participant will learn only their own payoffs.  
Calculation of Earnings 
 
Earnings depend on whether the voter voted for the candidate, whether and which offer he/she accepted 
an offer from the candidate and the color of the drawn ball. The following tables summarize this 














 if does not vote












 if does not vote




 if does not vote
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 if does not vote
















20 +	50	– Up-front payment 	 20 – Up-front payment  
Conditional 
payment 
20 + 50 – Post-election transfer  20 
Do not accept 
payment 





Once all 20 rounds are finished, the computer will randomly pick one round out of the 20 rounds you 
have played. The earnings you made on that round will be your final earnings of the experiment. We will 
convert tokens you earned in this round into US dollars by dividing them by 10. In addition, you will 
receive a participation fee of $7. 
Are there any questions? 
 
Appendix B: Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1
Proposition 2.1. (Selfish risk neutral preferences). Suppose both players care only
about their won material payoffs and are risk neutral. Then vote buying may occur only if
(p′−p)W ≥ d. Moreover, whenever the candidate makes a nonzero offer, he offers both up-
front payment and conditional payment which are equal to the cost of voting in expectation.
Proof. A risk neutral candidate submits a non-zero offer (mUFP ,mCP ) = (x, y) provided
that the voter’s contribution to the winning probability is sufficiently high. The voter can
accept at most one payment type in exchange for her vote, therefore, for any offer (x, y) the
voter chooses among her 4 options: (1) Vote without accepting payment (VwP), (2) Accept
up-front payment (UFP), (3) Accept conditional payment (CP), and (4) do not vote (DNV).
The optimal strategy for a risk neutral voter is to accept a transfer from a candidate only if
at least one payment is larger than the cost of voting in expectation. If both payments are
larger than the cost of voting, she accepts the transfer that has the largest expected payment:
v∗(x, y) =

UFP if max {x− d, p′y − d, 0} = x− d
CP if max {x− d, p′y − d, 0} = p′y − d
DNV if max {x− d, p′y − d, 0} = 0
(B.1)
Given voter’s strategy, it is rational for the candidate to buy the vote when its expected
contribution is higher than its cost, i.e. i.e. (p′ − p)W ≥ d. Moreover, the candidate is
indifferent between offering UFP and CP when vote buying is rational for the candidate.
That is, when it is rational to buy the vote, there is no case where CP is not feasible but UFP
is. To see this suppose that it is not the case, i.e. (p′ − p)W ≥ d and Bc +W < dp′ . Then the












Hence the candidate’s SPE strategy is offering (x∗, y∗) = (d, dp′ ) if (p
′ − p)W ≥ d and
(x∗, y∗) = (0, 0) otherwise.
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if (p′ − p)W ≥ d
(0, 0) if (p′ − p)W < d
(B.2)

B.2 Proof of Proposition 2.2
Proposition 2.2. (Risk aversion). If the candidate is more (less) risk averse than the
voter, vote buying occurs only with conditional (up-front) payment.
Proof. Assume p′ < 1. Let (mUFP ,mCP ) = (x, y) and suppose Bv = Bc = B. For all
possible risk preferences, the minimum accepted UFP by the voter is x = d. In turn, the
minimum accepted CP by the voter satisfies
p′uv(B + y− d) + (1− p′)uv(B − d) = uv(B)
This equality can be rewritten as
uv(B)− uv(B − d)




For the candidate, the utility difference between UFP and CP is given by
Uv(UFP, x = d)− Uv(CP, y = y) =
[





p′uc(B +W − y) + (1− p′)uc(B)
]
= p′ [uc(B +W − d)− uc(B +W − y)]
+ (1− p′) [uc(B)− uc(B − d)]




≤ uc(B)− uc(B − d)
uc(B +W − d)− uc(B +W − y)
(B.4)
Without loss of generality, suppose the candidate is more risk averse than the voter.
Then uc(x) = ϕ(uv(x)) for all x, where ϕ′ > 0 and ϕ′′ < 0, i.e. uc(.) is a concave transforma-
tion of uv(.). Then the candidate, who is more risk averse than the voter, prefers CP over
UFP if
uv(B)− uv(B − d)




≤ uc(B)− uc(B − d)
uc(B +W − d)− uc(B +W − y)
⇒ uv(B)− uv(B − d)
uv(B + y− d)− uv(B)
≤ ϕ(uv(B))− ϕ(uv(B − d))
ϕ(uv(B +W − d))− ϕ(uv(B +W − y))
(B.5)
123
Suppose uv(.) is a continuously differentiable function. Then if (B.5) holds, the follow-
















ϕ′(uv(B +W − d))
(B.6)
⇒ 1 ≤ ϕ
′(uv(B))
ϕ′(uv(B +W − d))
The last inequality is satisfied as long as W > d since uv(.) is an increasing function
and ϕ(.) is an increasing and concave function. Note that vote buying is never rational if
W ≤ d. Hence given that vote buying is rational, the candidate prefers buying the vote
with CP over UFP in equilibrium if the candidate is more risk averse than the voter.
Conversely, if the voter is more risk averse than the candidate uv(x) = φ(uc(x)) for all
x, where ψ′ > 0 and ψ′′ < 0, i.e. uv(.) is a concave transformation of uc(.). Then uc(x) =
φ(uv(x)) where φ = ψ−1(.) is an increasing and convex function. The candidate prefers
UFP over CP if the utility difference given in (B.3) is greater than zero, or equivalently if
uv(B)− uv(B − d)




≥ uc(B)− uc(B − d)
uc(B +W − d)− uc(B +W − y)
uv(B)− uv(B − d)
uv(B + y− d)− uv(B)
≥ φ(uc(B))− ucφ((B − d))
φ(uc(B +W − d))− φ(uc(B +W − y))
(B.7)





φ′(uc(B +W − d))
1 ≥ φ
′(uc(B))
φ′(uc(B +W − d))
(B.8)
The last inequality is satisfied as long as W > d since uv(.) is an increasing function
and φ(.) is an increasing and convex function. Therefore, given that vote buying is rational
if the candidate is less risk averse than the voter, the candidate prefers UFP over CP in
equilibrium. 
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B.3 Utility Functions of the Candidate and the Voter under FS Preferences
Let (mUFP ,mCP ) = (x, y) be an offer. Voter’s utility from accepting UFP is given by
Uv(UFP, x = z) =





B + (1 + 2(αp′ − β(1− p′))) z







B + (1− 2β) z − (1− β) d+ βp′W if z ≥ W+d2
(B.9)
Note that if β < 12 and hence voter’s UFP utility is uniquely maximized at B for every
p′ ∈ [0, 1].
Voter’s utility from accepting CP is given by
Uv(CP, y = z) =

B + p′(1 + 2α)z − (1 + α)d− αp′W if z ≤ W+d2
B + p′ (1− 2β) z
− (1 + α(1− p′)− βp′) d+ βp′W if z ≥ W+d2
(B.10)
For β < 12 , voter’s utility from CP is uniquely maximized at B +W .
Candidate’s utility from up-front payment is
Uc(UFP, x = z) =





B + p′(1− β)W − (1 + 2(α(1− p′)− βp′)) z







B + p′(1 + α)W − (1 + 2α) z + αd if z ≥ W+d2
(B.11)
For β < 12 , candidate’s UFP utility is uniquely maximized at z = 0 for every p
′.
Candidate’s utility from CP is given by
Uc(CP, y = z) =

B + p′(1− β)W − p′(1− 2β)z − βd if z ≤ W+d2
B + p′(1 + α)W − p′ (1 + 2α) z
+(αp′ − β(1− p′))d if z ≥ W+d2
(B.12)
B.4 Proof of Proposition 2.3
Proposition 2.3. (Inequity aversion). Suppose both players are inequity averse and








, vote buying occurs with conditional payment only. If






vote buying may occur either with up-front payment
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or conditional payment. Moreover, the minimum accepted payment of the voter depends
on W .
Proof. Since the vote buying game is a finite game with complete information, we will
proceed with backward induction.
Voter choice, up-front payment
Let (mUFP ,mCP ) = (x, y) be the candidate’s offer. We will solve for the minimum
accepted offer for each payment type for the voter.
For up-front payment, let x be the voter’s minimum accepted payment. Then
Uv(UFP ; z = x) = Uv(DNV )








= B + (1 + 2α)t− (1 + α)d− αp′W
≤ B + (1 + 2α)d
2
− (1 + α)d− αp′W
= B − αp′W − d
2
< B − αpW = Uv(DNV )







. Then, x satisfies
B +
[




1 + αp′ − β(1− p′)
)
d− αp′W = B − αpW
⇒ x1 =
α(p′ − p)W + (1 + αp′ − β(1− p′)) d
1 + 2(αp′ − β(1− p′))
(B.13)
Note that x ≥ d2 for all p
′:
2α(p′ − p)W + 2(1 + αp′ − β(1− p′))d ≥ (1 + 2(αp′ − β(1− p′)))d
⇒ 2α(p′ − p)W + d ≥ 0
However x ≤ W+d2 for some p
′:
2α(p′ − p)W + 2(1 + αp′ − β(1− p′))d ≤ (1 + 2(αp′ − β(1− p′)))W + d
2




Next, assume that x ≥ W+d2 . Then
B + (1− 2β) x− (1− β) d+ βp′W = B − αpW
⇒ x2 =
−(βp′ + αp)W + (1− β)d
1− 2β
(B.15)
For x ≥ W+d2 , p
′ should satisfy
−(βp′ + αp)W + (1− β)d ≥ (1− 2β)W + d
2
⇒ p′ ≤ (2β − 2αp− 1)W + d
2β
(B.16)
Combining (B.14) and (B.16), we get the following minimum accepted offers for the
voter, based on the candidate’s probability of winning with the vote:
x =
x1 if p′ ≥
(2β−2αp−1)W+d
2β




Candidate’s participation constraint for vote buying with up-front payment
The candidate prefers to buy vote with UFP over not buying vote if Uc(z = x;UFP ) ≥







. Then individual rationality condition is satis-
fied if
(1 + α− β)
1 + 2(αp′ − β(1− p′))︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
(p′ − p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0




⇒ p′W − d− pW − 2(p′ − p)(α+ β)(1− p′)W ≥ 0 (B.18)
Assume next that x ≥ W+d2 . Then the candidate prefers buying vote with up-front
payment to not buying vote if Uc(z = x2;UFP ) ≥ Uc(.; DNV)
B + p′(1 + α)W − (1 + 2α)
[
−(βp′ + αp)W + (1− β)d
1− 2β
]
+ αd ≥ B + p(1− β)W
⇒
[











⇒ 1 + α− β
1− 2β
[
p′W − (1− 2(α+ β))pW − d
]
≥ 0 (B.19)





(1− 2(α+ β))p+ d
W
,




As the final step notice that if p′W − d < 0, neither (B.18) not (B.19) can be satisfied.
Voter choice, conditional payment












B + p′(1 + 2α)y− (1 + α)d− αp′W = B − αpW
y1 =
α(p′ − p)W + (1 + α) d
p′(1 + 2α)
(B.21)
However, note that the found y may not be in the assumed interval, so the following
inequality also has to be satisfied
y1 =
α(p′ − p)W + (1 + α) d
p′(1 + 2α)
?













If we assume y ∈
[
W+d









B + p′(1− 2β)y− (1 + α(1− p′)− βp′)d+ βp′W = B − αpW
y2 =
−(βp′ + αp)W + (1 + α(1− p′)− βp′)d
p′(1− 2β)
(B.23)
Again the found y2 has to be in the assumed interval:
y2 =
−(βp′ + αp)W + (1 + α(1− p′)− βp′)d
p′(1− 2β)
?













Combining (B.22) and (B.24) we get
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y =
y1 if p′ ≥
2[(1+α)d−αpW ]
(2α+1)d+W




Voter: Relation between up-front and conditional payment
Lemma B.1. Let yx be the utility equivalent conditional payment to an up-front payment of x for
the voter. Then yx ≥ x.
Proof. If conditional payment of yx is equivalent to an up-front payment ofx thenUv(CP, z =
yx) = Uv(UFP, z = x). Note that the slope of Uv(UFP ) is greater than or equal to that of






(1 + 2α)(1− p′) if z ≤ d2(1− 2β)(1− p′) if z ≥ d2
Observe also that Uv(CP, z = 0) = Uv(UFP, z = 0) = B − (1 + α)d− αp′W . It follows that
yx ≥ x. 
Candidate: Choice between buying vote with up-front and conditional payment
Suppose both UFP and CP are rational for the candidate. Then the optimal offer of
the candidate depends on the utility difference Uc(z = x;UFP, ) − Uc(z = y;CP ). We
will consider 3 cases: (1) x = x1 and y = y1, where x1,y1 ≤ W+d2 , (2) x = x1 and y =
y2, where x1 ≤ W+d2 and y1 ≥
W+d
2 , (3) x = x2 and y = y2, where x2,y2 ≥
W+d
2 .
Case 1: Suppose first that y = y1 ≤ W+d2 . Then by Lemma B.1, x ≤ y ≤
W+d
2 , i.e.







. In this case the
utility difference Uc(UFP )− Uc(CP ) is given by
B + p′(1− β)W − (1 + 2(α(1− p′)− βp′))
[
α(p′ − p)W + (1 + αp′ − β(1− p′))d
1 + 2(αp′ − β(1− p′))
]
(B.26)
+ (α(1− p′)− βp′)d−
[
B + p′(1− β)W − p′(1− 2β)
[





Rearranging (B.26), we find
2(α+ β)(1 + α− β)(p′ − 1)
(1 + 2α)(1 + 2(αp′ − β(1− p′)))
[
2α(p′ − p)W + d
]
≤ 0 (B.27)
Therefore CP dominates UFP if x = x1 and y = y1 .
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Case 2: Suppose now that y = y2 and x = x1. Then by (B.17) and (B.25),
p′ ∈
[
(2β − 2αp− 1)W + d
2β
,
2[(1 + α)d− αpW ]
(2α+ 1)d+W
]
Then the utility difference is
B + p′(1− β)W − (1 + 2(α(1− p′)− βp′))
[
α(p′ − p)W + (1 + αp′ − β(1− p′))d
1 + 2(αp′ − β(1− p′))
]
+ (α(1− p′)− βp′)d−B − p′(1 + α)W
+ p′(1 + 2α)
[
−(βp′ + αp)W + (1 + α(1− p′)− βp′)d
p′(1− 2β)
]
− (αp′ − β(1− p′))d
This expression simplifies to
K
[[










−2(α+ β)(1 + α− β)
(1− 2β)(1 + 2(α+ β)p′ − 2β)
Note thatW ’s coefficient is strictly less than zero. This is because (1+2αp−2β(1−p′)) ≤
0 ⇔ p′ ≤ 1 − 1+2αp2β , but p
′ is less than a number between 0 and 1 only if 1+2αp2β ≤ 1, which
implies that 1 ≤ 2(β−αp). For 0 < β ≤ α andα+β < 1 the previous inequality cannot hold.
Thus it must be that (1 + 2αp − 2β(1 − p′)) > 0. Hence the utility difference Uc(UFP ) −
Uc(CP ) decreasing in W. Denote the prize level that satisfies Uc(UFP ) = Uc(CP ) as W̃ .
Then for W < W̃ , UFP dominates CP and vice versa. From (??), we find W̃ as
W̃ =
1− 2β(1− p′)2 + 2α(1− p′)p′




Now consider the candidate’s individual rationality for UFP. The utility difference be-
tween buying vote with UFP and not buying vote, Uc(UFP )− Uc(No Offer) with W = W̃
is given by
(p′ − p(1− β)W̃ − 1 + 2(α(1− p
′)− βp′
1 + 2(αp′ − β(1− p′))
[
α(p′ − p)W̃ + (1 + αp′ − β(1− p′))d
]
+ (α(1− p′)− βp′)d
which simplifies to
1 + α− β
1 + 2(αp′ − β(1− p′))
[




1 + 2(αp′ − β(1 − p′)) is always positive for β < 12 . Thus the sign of this expression
depends on the sign of the parenthesis. Combining (B.28) and (B.29), we get
1 + α− β





(1− 2(α+ β)(1− p′))1− 2β(1− p
′)2 + 2α(1− p′)p′
1 + 2αp− 2β(1− p′)
− 1
]
Now note that Uc(UFP )−Uc(No Offer) ≤ 0 atW = W̃ , since the expression inside the
parenthesis above is negative due to
(p′ − p)
[
1− 2(α+ β)(1− p′)
] [




1 + 2αp− 2β(1− p′)
]
⇒ − (1 + 2(α+ β)p′ − 2β)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
p+ 2(α+ β)(1− p′)2(p′ − p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
 ≤ 0 (B.30)
As a result, we show that if UFP dominates CP in case 2, it is also the case that UFP is
not rational. Hence vote buying with UFP should not occur in case 2.
Case 3: Suppose now that y = y2 and x = x2. Then by (B.17) and (B.25),
p′ ≤ min
{
(2β − 2αp− 1)W + d
2β
,
2[(1 + α)d− αpW ]
(2α+ 1)d+W
}
The utility difference is
B + p′(1 + α)W − (1 + 2α)
[
−(βp′ + αp)W + (1− β)d
1− 2β
]
+ αd−B − p′(1 + α)W
+ p′(1 + 2α)
[
−(βp′ + αp)W + (1 + α(1− p′)− βp′)d
p′(1− 2β
]




(α+ β)(1− p′)d ≥ 0 (B.31)
implying that the candidate prefers UFP over CP in this case. However if B < W+d2 , the
candidate will be unable to offer x2 to the voter due to his budget constraint as the largest
possible UFP offer is B.
Rationality of UFP in Case 3 if B > W+d2







. Thus for case 3 to
exist, both (2β−2αp−1)W+d2β and
2[(1+α)d−αpW ]
(2α+1)d+W need to be positive. This can occur only if









= 1 + 2αp− 2β
for α ≥ β > 0 and α + β < 1. Note also that we need αp < β, since dW cannot be strictly
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greater than 1 for d < W .
Individual rationality condition of the candidate for UFP= x2 is given by
B + p′(1 + α)W − 1 + 2α
1− 2β
[
−(βp′ + αp)W (1− β)d
]
+ αd−B − p(1− β)d ≥ 0
which simplifies to
(1 + α− β)
[
(p′ − (1− 2(α+ β))p)W − d
]
≥ 0 (B.32)
(B.32) is satisfied only if [(p′ − (1− 2(α+ β))p)W − d] ≥ 0, or equivalently
p′ − p ≥ d
W
− 2(α+ β)p
The expression above implies that vote buying might be rational for an inequity averse
candidate for some p and p′ such that p′ − p < dW (but it is never rational for a selfish
candidate).
Thus the following conditions need to hold for UFP= x2 to be rational:
a. dW > 1 + 2αp− 2β
b. αp < β







d. p′ − p ≥ dW − 2(α+ β)p
Can all of these conditions hold at the same time? By combining (a) and (d) above we
find that p′ > (1− 2β)(1 + p) (e). Combining this with (c) yields the following inequalities
(1− 2β)(1 + p) < p′ ≤ min
{
(2β − 2αp− 1)W + d
2β
,





(i) (1− 2β)(1 + p) < (2β−2αp−1)W+d2β ⇒ p <
d−(1−2β)(W+2β)
2αW+2β(1−2β)






d− (1− 2β)(W + 2β)
2αW + 2β(1− 2β)
,
(1 + 4αβ + 2β)d− (1− 2β)W




Thus if either d− (1− 2β)(W + 2β) ≤ 0 or (1 + 4αβ + 2β)d− (1− 2β)W ≤ 0, UFP= x2
is never rational. Conversely, UFP= x2 is rational only if d − (1 − 2β)(W + 2β) > 0 and









1 + 4αβ + 2β
}
= 1− 2β + (1− 2β)2β
W
(B.35)





Otherwise UFP= x2 is never rational. Note that the number on the right is decreasing in β,
i.e. higher inequity aversion is correlated with higher likelihood of the candidate finding
UFP= x2 rational. Also, the higher the ratio of cost of voting to the prize, the more likely
that a candidate will find UFP= x2 rational.
Rationality of vote buying with conditional payment
We finally need to show that there are cases in which the candidate prefers vote buying
with conditional payment to not buying vote.
Suppose that y = y1 ≤ W+d2 (which implies p
′ ≥ 2[(1+α)d−αpW ](2α+1)d+W ). Then buying vote with
conditional payment is individually rational for the candidate if
B + p′(1− β)W − p′(1− 2β)
[
α(p′ − p)W + (1 + α)d
p′(1 + 2α)
]
− βd−B − p(1− β)W ≥ 0
⇒ 1 + α− β
1 + 2α
[
(p′ − p)W − d
]
≥ 0 (B.36)
Combining the y = y1 condition on p′ and the individual rationality constraint given
above we find
p ≤ d(W − d)
W (W + d)
Thus, paying y1 ≤ W+d2 is rational if (p
′ − p)W − d ≥ 0 and p ≤ d(W−d)W (W+d) .
Next, suppose that y = y2 ≥ W+d2 (which occurs if p
′ ≤ 2[(1+α)d−αpW ](2α+1)d+W ). Then buying
vote with conditional payment is individually rational for the candidate if
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B + p′(1 + α)W − p′(1 + 2α)
[
−(βp′ + αp)W + (1 + α(1− p′)− βp′)d
p′(1− 2β)
]
+ (αp′ − β(1− p′))d−B − p(1− β)W ≥ 0
⇒ 1 + α− β
1− 2β
[
(p′ − (1− 2(α+ β))p)W − (1 + 2(α+ β)(1− p′))d
]
≥ 0
⇒ 1 + α− β
1− 2β
[
(p′ − p)W − d+ 2(α+ β)
(
pW − (1− p′)d
)]
≥ 0
⇒ p′ ≥ (1− 2(α+ β))pW + (1 + 2(α+ β))d
W + 2(α+ β)d
(B.37)
Note that if 1 − 2(α + β) > 0, p′W − d < 0 is sufficient for nonrationality of CP= y2.
Thus, for a candidate who has sufficiently strong inequity aversion it might be possible
that paying y2 is rational. To see if this is indeed the case, we combine the inequalities on
p′ obtained from the individual rationality constraint and the condition on p′ for y = y2.
Thus if CP = y2 is rational, p′ should satisfy
(1− 2(α+ β))pW + (1 + 2(α+ β))d
W + 2(α+ β)d
≤ p′ ≤ 2 [(1 + α)d− αpW ]
(2α+ 1)d+W
(B.38)
There are three cases for which (B.38) cannot hold:
1. We have p′ ≥ k > 1 if the number on the LHS is strictly greater than 1. This is the
case if 1− 2(α+ β) > W−dpW > 0.
2. We have p′ ≤ k < 0 if the number on the RHS is strictly less than 0. This is the
case if α > dpW−d . Note that if pW − d < 0, the condition is trivially satisfied since
α > 0 > dpW−d .
3. Assuming 1 − 2(α + β) < W−dpW and α <
d
pW−d , the number on the RHS is smaller
than the number on the LHS if (1− 2β)(d2 + dW (p− 1) + pW 2) > 0, or equivalently
if p > d(W−d)W (W+d) .
Thus if 1− 2(α+ β) < W−dpW , α <
d
pW−d and p ≤
d(W−d)
W (W+d) , CP= y2 ≥
W+d
2 is rational.
For more specific conditions under which CP is rational, consider the following sub-
cases:




(2α+1)d+W . Note that
the number on the right handside is lest than 1 if and only if d < W . Moreover the
individual rationality constraint given by (B.36) implies p′W ≥ d. Assuming d < W















Next, assume that y = y2. Then by (??), p′ ≤
2(1+α)d
(2α+1)d+W . The IR constraint given by
(B.37) implies p′ ≥ (1+2(α+β))dW+2(α+β)d . Combining the two inequalities yields
(1 + 2(α+ β))d
W + 2(α+ β)d
≤ p′ ≤ 2(1 + α)d
(2α+ 1)d+W
(B.40)
These inequalities constitute a meaning interval for p′ if the number on LHS is less
than the number on the RHS, i.e. if (1− 2β)(d−W ) ≤ 0, which holds for all d < W .
Therefore, assuming d < W , CP≥ W+d2 is rational if p
′ satisfies (B.40).
p′ = p : Assume first that y = y1. Then (B.36) implies −d ≥ 0, which is a contradiction.
Hence CP≤ W+d2 is never rational if p
′ = p.




• d > 2(α + β)W , we have a contradiction since the individual rationality con-
straint implies p′ > 1.
• d = 2(α + β)W , individual rationality constraint implies that p′ = 1. But note
that p′ = p = 1 is consistent with the [y] = y2 condition on p′ given in (??) only
if d ≥W .
• d < 2(α + β)W , combining the individual rationality constraint and y = y2
condition we get
[1 + 2(α+ β)] d
2(α+ β)(W + d)
≤ p′ ≤ 2(1 + α)d
(2α+ 1)(d+W )
(B.41)
For the number on the left hand side of the inequality to be less than the number
on the RHS above, we need 1− 2β ≤ 0 which is a contradiction since β < 12 .
Therefore CP≥ W+d2 is never rational if p
′ = p as well.





. The individual rationality
constraint implies p ≤ W−dW . Combining these two inequalities, we find that CP≤
W+d























Note that we have a contradiction if 1−2(α+β) ≤ 0, thus assume that 1−2(α+β) > 0.
135















For the number on the left hand side to be less than the number on the right hand side
above, we need (2α + β) ≥ 12 . For these inequalities to reflect a meaningful interval
for probability, we also need the upper bound to be at most 1, implying α ≥ W−d2W .








. If α satisfies this constraint, CP≥ W+d2 is rational for p satisfying
(B.43).

B.5 Screenshots from experiment program and instructions
Figure B.1
Candidate screen for offer selection
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Figure B.2





Welcome and thank you for coming today to participate in this experiment. This is an experiment in 
decision-making. If you follow the instructions and make good decisions, you can earn a significant 
amount of money, which will be paid to you at the end of the session. The currency in this experiment is 
called tokens (10 tokens = 1USD). The experiment consists of 20 identical decision rounds.  
During the experiment it is important that you do not talk to any other subjects. Please either turn off 
your cell phones or put them on silent. If you have a question, please raise your hand, and an 
experimenter will answer your question. Failure to comply with these instructions means that you will be 




At the beginning of the experiment you will be randomly assigned a role. The two possible roles you can 
be assigned are `Voter’ and `Candidate’. There will be an equal number of voters and candidates. Your 
roles will stay fixed for all 20 rounds until the end of the experiment. That is, if at the beginning of the 
experiment you were assigned the role of a candidate (voter), you will keep this role for the entire 
experiment.  
At the beginning of each round, all participants will be randomly paired, with each pair consisting of one 
voter and one candidate. Since you are most likely to be matched with a different participant in each 
round, it will be impossible to track your counterpart between rounds. No participant will ever be 
informed about the identities of the participants they are paired with, neither during nor after the 
experiment. 
 
In this experiment, at each round, both the voter and the candidate are assigned 20 tokens. Each round, 
the candidate has the chance to win 200 additional tokens. Whether the candidate wins the additional 
tokens is determined randomly by the computer in the following way: The candidate wins the election 
(and hence the additional 200 tokens)if the computer draws a WHITE ball from an urn that contains RED 
and WHITE balls. The total number of balls contained in the urn is fixed at 100, but the number of white 
balls in the urn will change from one round to another.   
The voter can increase the number of white balls (by exchanging them with red balls) in the urn by voting 
for the candidate. However, this costs 10 tokens to the voter.  
Payment Types 
A payment is what a candidate can offer the voter in exchange for their vote. The payment is in terms of 
tokens and it can take two possible forms, “Up-front Payment” and “Conditional Payment”. 
 An up-front payment, if accepted by the voter, is paid to the voter prior to the election.  
 A conditional payment, if accepted by the voter, is paid to the voter if the candidate wins (i.e. 
payment is conditioned on the candidate winning the election) and hence paid after the election. 
 
Development of each round  
For each group, each of the 20 rounds consists of an election process with the following sequence of 
events: 
1. Both the candidate(C) and the voter (V) are informed about the following: 
 Number of white balls in the urn 
 Number of white balls in the urn if the voter votes for the candidate 
 
2. In each group, the candidate decides on the number of tokens he/she offers for each type of 
payment. The offer cannot be greater than what the candidate owns at the time of payment. 
 
Note that this implies that an up-front payment cannot be greater than 20 tokens, and a 
conditional payment cannot be greater than 220 tokens. 
 
3. Once the candidate submits his/her offers, the voter is informed about these offers. The voter is 
then asked to choose among the following options: (a) Accept Up-front Payment in exchange for 
Vote, (b) Accept Conditional Payment in exchange for Vote, (c) Do not accept payment.  
 
4. Both V and C learn about voter’s choice over the candidate’s offer. If the voter has accepted Up-
front Payment, the amount accepted is transferred to the voter’s account. 
 
5. Voter decides whether to vote or not. Number of white balls is adjusted corresponding to the 
voter’s choice over voting or not voting for C.  
 
6. The computer draws a ball from the urn, and announces its color. Both V and C are informed 
about the result of the election. 
 
7. If the voter has accepted Conditional Payment and the candidate has won the election, the 
candidate decides whether or not to make the agreed payment. 
 




Earnings depend on whether the voter voted for the candidate, which offer he/she accepted an offerfrom 
the candidate and the color of the drawn ball. The following tables summarize this information for the 










20 + Up-front payment – 10 20+ Up-front payment – 10 
Conditional 
payment 
20 + Conditional payment – 10 20–10  
Voting w/o 
payment 
20–10 = 10 20–10 











20+200−Up-front payment 20  – Up-front payment 
Conditional 
payment 
20+200− Conditional payment 20 
Voting w/o 
payment 
20+200 = 220 20 




Once all 20 rounds are finished, the computer will randomly pick one round out of the 20 rounds you 
have played. The earnings you made on that round will be your final earnings of the experiment. We will 
convert tokens you earned in this round into US dollars by dividing them by 10. In addition, you will 
receive a participation fee of 5 USD. 
 
Are there any questions? 
Appendix C: Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Inequity Aversion – Proof of Proposition 3.2
Proposition 3.2. (Inequity aversion). If Player B is inequity averse, she may decline a
transfer from Player A. More specifically, if
(i) β ≤ 34 and β <
1









, then Player B rejects Player A’s transfer;
(iii) β ≥ 1k+1 and k ≥
1





Proof. Suppose Player B is inequity averse (0 < β < 1) and has utility function (3.1). Since
the game is played only once, I proceed with backward induction.
In stage 3, Player B’s utility is given by
u(b; k) = 400− b− αmax{kb− (400− b), 0} − βmax{400− (k + 1)b, 0} (C.1)
First note that if (k + 1)b ≥ 400,
u(b; k) = (1 + α)400− (1 + α+ αk)b (C.2)
and ∂u∂b < 0 ∀α, k ≥ 0. Thus Player B’s optimal giving has to satisfy bk ≤
400
k+1 .
Second, if (k + 1)b ≤ 400
u(b; k) = (1− β)400− (1− β − βk)b (C.3)
and ∂u∂b = βk + β − 1. Thus Player B’s optimal giving is given by
bk






if β = 1k+1




In stage 2, Player B decides whether to accept or reject. Note that u(Reject) = 100.
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• Suppose β < 1k+1 . Then, u(Accept, bk = 0) = (1− β)400. Player B rejects if




and accepts if β ≤ 34 .








400− 100 ≤ 0 ⇔ k ≤ 1
3
(C.6)














C.2 Guilt Aversion – Proof of Proposition 3.3
Proposition 3.3. (Guilt aversion). If Player B is guilt averse, she may decline a transfer
from Player A, i.e. there exists k ≥ 0, eB ≥ 0 and Φ ≥ 0 such that utility of rejecting
is higher than accepting a transfer from Player A. Moreover, Player B’s utility difference
between accepting and rejecting weakly increases in k and weakly decreases in eB . For
some eB , this utility difference is lower when Player B cannot transfer eB to Player A than
when she can transfer eB to Player A. If Player B accepts, her giving back weakly decreases
in k and weakly increases in eB .
Proof. Suppose Player B is guilt averse and has utility function (3.2). Let eB ≥ 0 be Player
B’s second-order belief. In stage 3, Player B’s utility is given by
u(b; k, eB) = 400− b− Φ max {0, eB − kb} (C.8)
















< 0 if Φk < 1 ⇒ bk = 0
(C.9)
In stage 2, Player B decides whether to accept or reject. Note that u(Reject) = 100 −
Φ max {0, eB − 100}. Case 1. Suppose Φk ≥ 1. Then,
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and u(Reject) = 100 (C.10)
Then, the utility difference between ”Accept” and ”Reject” is negative if
∆U = 300− eB
k
≤ 0 ⇔ 300k ≤ eB (C.11)
This yields the conditions: 300k ≤ eB ≤ 400k and eB < 100













and u(Reject) = (1 + Φ)100− ΦeB (C.12)
Then, the utility difference between ”Accept” and ”Reject” is negative if




This yields the conditions: 300+100ΦΦ ≤ eB ≤ 400k and eB > 100.




• (iii) if eB > 400k and eB ≤ 100,
u (Accept, 400; k, eB) = Φ(400k − eB) and u(Reject) = 100 (C.14)
Then, the utility difference between ”Accept” and ”Reject” is negative if




This yields the conditions: 100(4Φk−1)Φ ≤ eB < 100 and eB > 400k. However note that
400k < 100(4Φk−1)Φ ⇒ 0 < −1. Hence we can conclude that the utility difference
is positive in this case.




• (iv) if eB > 400k and eB > 100,
u (Accept, 400; k, eB) = Φ(400k − eB) and u(Reject) = (1 + Φ)100−ΦeB (C.16)
Then, the utility difference between ”Accept” and ”Reject” is negative if




This yields the conditions: 1k ≤ Φ ≤
1
4k−1 and k <
1
3




Case 2. Suppose Φk ≤ 1. Then, for all k ≥ 0, bk = 0.
• (i) if eB ≤ 400k and eB ≤ 100
u (Accept, 0; k, eB) = 400− ΦeB and u(Reject) = 100 (C.18)
Then, the utility difference between ”Accept” and ”Reject” is negative if




This yields the conditions: eB ≤ 400k, eB < 100 and eB ≤ 300Φ ⇒ Φ > 3.




• (ii) if eB ≤ 400k and eB > 100,
u (Accept, 0; k, eB) = 400− ΦeB and u(Reject) = (1 + Φ)100− ΦeB (C.20)
Then, the utility difference between ”Accept” and ”Reject” is always positive:
∆ = 300 + 100Φ > 0 (C.21)




• (iii) if eB > 400k and eB ≤ 100,
u (Accept, 0; k, eB) = 400− ΦeB and u(Reject) = 100 (C.22)
Then, the utility difference between ”Accept” and ”Reject” is negative if




This yields the conditions: 400k < eB ≤ 300Φ < 100 where Φ > 3 and k <
1
4 .




• (iv) if eB > 400k and eB > 100,
u (Accept, 0; k, eB) = 400− ΦeB and u(Reject) = (1 + Φ)100− ΦeB (C.24)
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Then, the utility difference between ”Accept” and ”Reject” is always positive:
∆ = 300 + 100Φ > 0 (C.25)




Now to show that Player B’s likelihood of rejection may be higher when she cannot
transfer her second-order belief to Player A, than when she can transfer her second-order
belief to Player A, consider the following case. Let Φk ≥ 1 and eB ≤ 100. Note that the
utility difference between accepting and rejecting is ∆ = 300 − eBk if eB ≤ 400k, and ∆ =
400Φk − ΦeB − 100 if eB > 400k. Note that
300− eB
k





− 100(1− Φk) < 0 (C.26)
Therefore, when eB ≤ 100, the likelihood of Player B to reject a transfer from Player A
is higher than when she cannot transfer eB to Player A.
Now suppose Φk ≥ 1 and eB > 100. In this case, the utility difference between accepting
and rejecting is ∆ = 300 + 100Φ − ΦeB if eB ≤ 400k, and ∆ = 400Φk − 100Φ − 100 if
eB > 400k. Denote the first utility difference with ∆1 and the second utility difference with
∆2. Then,
∆2 −∆1 = 400(Φk − 1) + Φ(eB − 200) ≶ 0 (C.27)
Therefore, there are some eB > 100 for which the likelihood of Player B to reject a transfer
from Player A is higher than when she cannot transfer eB to Player A.

C.3 Reciprocity – Proof of Proposition 3.4
Proposition 3.2. (Reciprocity). If Player B is reciprocal, she may decline a transfer from
Player A. More specifically, let ∆B(sA = send, sB = accept) = ∆B . If
(i) eB ≤ ē and θk ≥ 1(ē−eB)∆B , then Player B accepts Player A’s transfer and sends back
b∗ ∈ [0, 400];
(ii) eB ≤ ē and θk < 1(ē−eB)∆B and
• θ > 1eB(ē−eB) , then Player B will reject Player A’s transfer;
• θ ≤ 1eB(ē−eB) , then Player B will accepts Player A’s transfer and sends back b
∗ = 0;
(iii) eB > ē, then Player B accepts Player A’s transfer and sends back b∗ = 0.
Proof. Suppose Player B is reciprocal and has utility function (3.3) withλA = (ē−eB)∆B(sA, sB)
and λB = (kb− eB).
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In stage 3, Player B’s utility is given by
u(b; k, eB, ē) = 400− b− θ(ē− eB)(kb− eB) ∆B(send, accept)︸ ︷︷ ︸
400−100
(C.28)
• Suppose first that eB ≤ ē. Then, Player B may send a positive amount since
∂u
∂b
= −1 + θ(ē− eB)300k Q 0 (C.29)
Note that ∂2u∂b∂k = θ (ē− eB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
≥ 0 and ∂2u∂b∂eB = −θk ≤ 0. If the condition below holds




However note that if θ(ē− eB)300k < 1 ⇔ θk < 1300(ē−eB) , then bk = 0.
• Now suppose that eB > ē. Then, Player B would never send a positive amount:
∂u
∂b
= −1 + θ (ē− eB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
300k < 0 ⇒ bk = 0 ∀k ≥ 0 (C.31)
In stage 2, Player B’s utility from rejecting is given by u(Reject) = 100.
• If eB ≤ ē, the utility difference between accepting and rejecting is
∆U = 300− b+ 300θ(ē− eB)(kb− eB) Q 0 (C.32)
However note that (∂∆U)∂k = 300θ (ē− eB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
≥ 0 and (∂∆U)∂eB = −300θ(kb+ ē− 2eB) Q 0.
The first partial derivative results implies that the likelihood of Acceptance (Rejection)
increases (decreases) in transfer rate, k.
Specifically, if θk < 1300(ē−eB) , then ∆U = 300[1− θ(ē− eB)eB] since bk = 0 under this
condition. Thus if θ > 1eB(ē−eB) , Player B rejects.
The second partial derivative implies that for low levels of second-order beliefs, the
likelihood of Rejection increases in eB and for high levels of eB , likelihood of Rejection
decreases in eB . For example, if eB ≤ 0.5ē then (∂∆U)∂eB ≤ 0.
• If eB > ē, the utility difference between accepting and rejecting is positive for all k0,
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hence Player B always accepts a transfer:
∆U = 400− 300θ(ē− eB)eB = 300
4
3
− θ (ē− eB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
eB
 > 0 (C.33)

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C.4 Decisions of Individual Subjects
Figure C.1
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C.5 Screenshots from experiment program and instructions
Figure C.5
Player B Belief Elicitation
Figure C.6
Player B Transfer Acceptance
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Figure C.7
Player B Giving Back
Figure C.8
Player A Decision Screen
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Instructions
You will be randomly matched with one other participant to form a group.
In a group, each participant will have a different role: Person A and Person B. Your role
will be randomly assigned and displayed on the next page.
Both Person A and Person B will be given 100 tokens each initially. If Person B accepts
it, Person A will be able to send 100 tokens to Person B and the tokens will be tripled while
being transferred to Person B. If Person B rejects, the tokens will be returned to Person A.
That is, Person A will decide whether he or she would like to send tokens to Person B, and
Person B will decide whether he or she would like to accept tokens from Person A.
Additionally, if Person B accepts tokens from Person A, he or she will be able to send
tokens back to Person A. The tokens Person B decides to send back to Person A will be
multiplied by Person B’s transfer rate. Person A will not be able to reject a transfer from
Person B. Person B’s transfer rate will be randomly determined from the following list of
numbers: 0, 1/5, 1/3, 1 or 3, where each value is equally likely to be drawn. Person A will
not know Person B’s transfer rate while making his/her decision on whether to send tokens
to Person B. However Person B will be able to condition his/her decisions based on Person
B’s transfer rate value.
More specifically, for every possible value of Person B’s transfer rate, Person B will fill
out a form indicating whether he or she would accept or reject tokens from Person A and,
• If Person B states that he/she would accept tokens from Person A, then Person B will
be asked how many tokens he/she would like to send tokens back to Person A.
• If Person B states that he/she would reject tokens from Person A, then Person B will
not be asked whether he or she would like to send tokens back to Person A.
After Person A and Person B complete their respective decisions, a number will be
drawn randomly from 0, 1/5, 1/3, 1 and 3 for Person B’s transfer rate, and Person A’s
decision and Person B’s choices from the form will be combined and carried out.
The session will only take place once.
You will receive $0.25 simply for your participation in this study.
In addition, any tokens you receive will be converted to monetary earnings at a rate of
10 tokens to $0.05.
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